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Most rural households lack access to reliable and affordable finance for agriculture and other livelihood activities. Many small farmers 
live in remote areas where retail banking is limited and production risks are high. The recent financial crisis has made the provision of 
credit even tighter and the need to explore innovative approaches to rural and agricultural finance even more urgent.
Rural and agricultural finance innovations have significant potential to improve the livelihoods and food security of the poor. 
Although microfinance has been widely studied, a large knowledge gap still exists on the nuts and bolts of expanding access to rural 
and agricultural finance. IFPRI’s 2020 Vision Initiative approached the rural finance team of the Agriculture and Rural Development 
Department of the World Bank to conceptualize and assemble this collection of briefs to narrow the knowledge gap by examining 
innovations in providing financial services to rural households. They, in turn, asked leading experts around the world to share their 
perspectives and experiences, focusing on issues related to implementation and operations. Together with a companion set of 
briefs—Innovations in Insuring the Poor (2020 Focus 17) edited by Ruth Vargas Hill and Maximo Torero—this series contributes to the 
knowledge pool on innovative tools for effectively managing the risks faced by the rural poor.
This set of briefs clearly points out the importance of business realities faced by small farmers, including low education levels, the 
dominance of subsistence farming, and the lack of access to modern financial instruments. These conditions mean that new and 
innovative institutions are required to reach small farmers. Emerging communication technologies provide new opportunities for rural 
banking by reducing business costs and alleviating information asymmetries. New financing instruments, such as weather index-based 
insurance and microinsurance, also have great potential for managing the risks faced by small farmers. In addition, bundling financial 
services with nonfinancial services like marketing and extension services offers new opportunities for small farmers to increase their 
productivity and incomes. Finally, an enabling policy environment and legal framework, enforcement of rules and regulations, and a 
supportive rural infrastructure all contribute immensely to making sustainable access to finance a reality.
We are grateful to Renate Kloeppinger-Todd and Manohar Sharma for their work in bringing together these important briefs, to the 
brief authors for their analyses and insights, to the reviewers for their constructive comments, to Heidi Fritschel and Ashley St. Thomas 
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verywhere in the world, small agricultural producers are 
entrepreneurs, traders, investors, and consumers, all 
rolled into one. In all these roles, small agricultural households 
constantly seek to use available financial instruments to improve 
their productivity and secure the best possible consumption and 
investment choices for their families. But the package of financial 
services available to small farmers in developing countries is 
severely limited, especially for those living in remote areas with no 
access to basic market infrastructure.
When poor people have limited saving or borrowing options, 
their investment plans are stifled and it becomes harder for them to 
break out of poverty. If households have no access to insurance and 
are unable to accumulate small savings that enable them to pay for 
household and business expenses, especially during lean seasons, 
they are forced to limit their exposure to risk, even if high returns 
are expected, once again making the pathway out of poverty more 
arduous than necessary. Inadequate access to financial services is 
thus part of what is often called the “poverty trap.”
Microfinance and agriculture finance
In the 1980s and 1990s the deleterious impact of limited financial 
access caught the attention of many academics, policymakers, 
donor agencies, and development practitioners, who generated an 
outpouring of new thinking and new ideas. Innovative concepts 
such as group liability, village banking, microinsurance, and index-
based insurance were tested in new and emerging microfinance 
institutions. But progress on expanding agricultural finance—as 
opposed to nonagricultural microenterprise finance—lagged. 
Donors and governments that had invested heavily in agricultural 
development banks and agricultural credit in the 1980s and early 
1990s found that these efforts did not produce the expected results 
and withdrew their support. It was hoped that private commercial 
banks would step in, but for the most part they did not.
Financial institutions have demonstrated a lack of interest 
in agriculture finance for four reasons. First, many agricultural 
households were located in remote parts of the country and 
were often so widely dispersed that financial institutions found 
it challenging to provide cost-effective and affordable services. 
Second, big swaths of the agricultural population were subject to 
the same weather and climate risks, making it hard for providers 
of financial services to hedge risks or operate profitable insurance 
pools. Third, service providers, mainly urban-based, simply did not 
know enough about the business of agriculture to devise profitable 
financial products. Fourth, most small agricultural producers in 
developing countries had little education and little knowledge of 
how modern banking institutions work.
Recent progress in rural finance
Since the early 2000s a number of organizations have developed 
innovative approaches to financing agriculture. They have 
sometimes adapted microfinance concepts to the provision of 
agricultural finance, used good banking practices, and above all 
drawn on knowledge of agriculture to enter and succeed in this 
market. Many of these new approaches show great promise, but no 
single approach works for all situations. Rather, organizations have 
the most success when they are nondogmatic, apply comprehensive 
risk-management strategies and tools, retain the ability to pick and 
choose their clients rather than having the government do so, and 
are innovative and pragmatic.
This set of briefs explores how rural and agricultural finance 
can be profitable, without high levels of government subsidies, by 
examining a selection of successful interventions—out of the many 
being implemented in the developing world—and highlighting the 
lessons learned.
The briefs fall into four thematic areas: addressing the business 
reality of small farmers in developing countries, using modern 
communication technology to overcome the tyranny of distance and 
information bottlenecks, managing risks at the farm and household 
level, and bundling financial services with nonfinancial services to 
address the multiple constraints faced by most small farmers.
Addressing the business reality of small farmers
Most small farmers in developing countries have little education 
and limited exposure to modern financial instruments. Further, 
many of these small farmers have only recently transitioned from 
subsistence to commercial farming, and their contact with the cash 
economy and experience in cash management is limited. Hence, in 
Brief 2 Monique Cohen addresses the issue of financial literacy and 
explains why the poor may need some coaching on how modern 
financial instruments can better their lives.
Additionally, many small farmers in developing countries 
live in remote rural settings, where urban-based retail banking is 
unavailable. In Brief 3 Anne Ritchie describes two operational models 
used by community-based financial organizations and explains 
how community banking enables the unbanked rural poor to serve 
themselves, with or without links to the formal financial sector.
As rural banking takes hold in developing countries, it has also 
attracted the attention of institutions in developed countries that 
have traditionally served farmers. The Netherlands-based Rabobank, 
for example, has made investments in countries as varied as China, 
Paraguay, and Zambia. In Brief 4 Gerard van Empel describes 
Rabobank’s use of a supply-chain approach to address key gaps in 
rural banking in many developing-country contexts.
Ghana’s network of rural and community banks represents a 
unique approach to generating access to financial services across 
the rural areas of a whole country. In Brief 5 Ajai Nair and Azeb 
Fissha describe their business model, their services, and their 
financial performance. The brief discusses the challenges facing the 
network and its apex institution in becoming financially sustainable 
and competitive and draws lessons that are applicable elsewhere.
The financing of productive assets requires access to medium-
term loans and usually significant collateral, neither of which are 
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leasing as an alternative to credit, which can help ease the provision 
of credit for investments in movable assets in rural areas. The brief 
describes the benefits of leasing to the client and the provider and 
identifies lessons on how to manage and support financial leasing in 
rural areas.
Finally, a key issue in financial service delivery is how to 
effectively increase repayment rates. In Brief 7 Yanyan Liu and 
Klaus Deininger discuss this issue in the context of self-help groups 
(SHGs) in India. Their analysis of the factors affecting repayment 
performance among low-income SHGs shows that effective 
application of rules pertaining to loan terms is more important than 
group characteristics in improving repayment performance.
Using modern communication technology 
Recent advances in communication technology affect rural banking 
in two key ways. First, by facilitating electronic payment systems 
and branchless banking, this technology can significantly slash 
transaction costs for both service providers and consumers. Second, 
using portable smart technology to establish identification and 
monitor clients can significantly alleviate information asymmetries 
and help improve repayment rates.
 In Brief 8 Susie Lonie describes how the cell phone–based 
payment service M-PESA now serves more than 9 million clients 
throughout Kenya, enabling them to remit money, make bill and 
loan payments, make cell phone–based payroll payments, and use 
banking services.
In Brief 9 Xavier Giné describes the results of an experiment 
to assess the impact of using biometric technology to monitor 
repayment performance of individuals in rural Malawi. This 
experiment showed that repayment rates increased by 40 percent 
for groups with a high default risk, and the benefits of improved 
repayment outweighed the cost of implementing the new technology.
Managing risk at the household and farm level
The management of risk is the key issue for financial institutions 
that finance agriculture, as well as for rural populations in 
general. In Brief 10 Mark D. Wenner analyzes various approaches 
to managing risk in financing agriculture. Index-based insurance 
schemes are one approach that has been implemented on a pilot 
basis in several countries. Such schemes use an easily observable 
index that is not subject to tampering. The index is correlated 
with the underlying risk and used to make decisions on insurance 
payouts, thus eliminating the cost of verification as well as 
incentives to misrepresent losses. In Brief 11 Jerry Skees and 
Benjamin Collier describe an ongoing pilot project in Peru that 
insures firms (such as microfinance institutions or firms in the value 
chain) serving smallholder households. The insurance pays out 
based on extreme El Niño events that create catastrophic flooding 
resulting in significant consequential losses and extra costs for a 
wide range of stakeholders in northern Peru.
Microinsurance has been developed as a risk management tool 
only recently. In addition to being more expensive to administer 
than savings and loan services, microinsurance schemes are plagued 
by more severe levels of adverse selection and moral hazard, which 
makes them challenging to provide on a sustainable, full-cost-
recovery basis. Brief 12 by Martina Wiedmaier-Pfister and Brigitte 
Klein surveys key experiences in providing insurance in rural areas, 
including important issues related to regulating microinsurance.
Bundling financial and nonfinancial services
In addition to financial constraints, small farmers in developing 
countries also face market constraints in acquiring needed inputs 
(such as fertilizer, seeds, and extension services). Returns to financial 
services are thus highly conditional on access to other nonfinancial 
services. Brief 13 by Vijay Mahajan and K. Vasumathi describes how 
BASIX in India provides services such as soil testing and health 
monitoring of livestock, along with credit, to farmers in a way that 
maximizes returns to credit services.
Brief 14 by Jonathan Campaigne and Tom Rausch describes 
a similar approach used by the DrumNet project in Kenya. In 
contrast to BASIX, however, the DrumNet project uses information 
technology to link key actors along the supply chain to farmers.
The way forward
This set of briefs seeks to initiate discussions among stakeholders 
by disseminating information on a selection of innovative, on-
the-ground initiatives designed to improve financial access for 
poor small farmers. All of these initiatives hold promise, but they 
also face challenges, and in the end some may not be suitable 
for a massive scale-up or for use in all country settings. Yet such 
initiatives demonstrate that it may be possible to eventually provide 
financing for agriculture on a sustainable basis at a reasonable cost.
Many of these initiatives are based on the premise that there is 
a supportive policy environment that allows innovation to flourish. 
The gravest risks to sustainable financing for agriculture often 
come not from inherent business risks or the inability of financial 
institutions to design profitable financial products for the rural 
population, but rather from misguided government interventions 
such as subsidized interest rates and lack of or non-enforcement 
of appropriate rules and regulations. Conversely, an enabling 
environment and legal framework, enforcement of regulations, and 
a supportive rural infrastructure would eventually lead to lower but 
sustainable interest rates by reducing transaction costs and risks 
and increasing competition. All this would contribute immensely to 
making sustainable access to finance a reality.  n
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he global financial crisis has intensified the problems of over-
indebtedness, especially for the poor. In this context,  
the microfinance industry is giving more attention to building  
their customers’ financial capabilities, designing products that 
respond to their needs and preferences, and ensuring their 
protection as consumers.
In a world where financial products and institutions are 
expanding rapidly, deciding which services to choose and how to 
use them is an increasing challenge. That challenge is especially 
great for customers who are poor and have limited experience in 
the formal financial sector. While money-management strategies 
can be innovative, the financial choices they make are defined by 
environments where informal financial practices are dominant and 
the consumer is often uncertain about commercial products and 
services. In increasingly complex and competitive financial markets, 
consumers with low levels of financial literacy lack the information 
and tools necessary to make informed decisions. Building financial 
capabilities can help people move from being overwhelmed by their 
financial options to being empowered by them.
Why is financial education important?
People at all income levels may have different resources and 
opportunities, but they still typically share common goals: They 
seek to put food on the table, educate their children, own a home, 
and plan for the future. To set aside even small amounts of money, 
low-income families need to be careful spenders as well as skilled 
money managers.
Financial education provides a foundation for managing 
money, which is an indispensable skill in a world where microfinance 
products and services are proliferating at the same time that overly 
aggressive financial services providers are ever ready to pressure 
the consumer. Building consumers’ financial capabilities is about 
doing more with the little at hand, readying the unbanked (people 
without access to conventional banking services) to enter the 
formal financial system and enabling the underbanked (people with 
limited access to conventional banking services) to do more with 
the financial services at their disposal. It is also about improving 
the performance of financial services providers. Findings from a 
randomized impact evaluation found that Self-Employed Women’s 
Association clients who attended financial literacy classes took 
out twice as many loans as women who did not (Pande, Field, and 
Jayachandran 2009).
How does financial education work?
Financial education is the process of building knowledge and skills 
to enable people to make more effective financial decisions while 
changing behaviors to build confidence in financial empowerment. 
The core of a financial-education agenda includes budgeting, saving, 
and managing debt. It also involves managing financial products 
such as insurance or remittances and making use of bank services.
Designing a financial-education program begins with a good 
understanding of the market. This means knowing the financial-
literacy levels of the target population and the most effective 
delivery channels to reach them. Identifying the most appropriate 
“teachable moments” for financial education—for example, when 
someone first opens a bank account, starts a business, or makes a 
transition to technology-enabled banking—makes the education 
relevant and reinforces behavior changes since people have an 
opportunity to apply what they learn in the context of real life.
How can financial education  
be successfully delivered?
An important debate among practitioners is how financial education 
can be delivered most effectively. Channels range from public 
campaigns and mass media to face-to-face communication and 
personal counseling, from small-group seminars to classroom-style 
workshops. Innovative delivery channels also include cell phones 
and other electronic media.
Experience has shown that there is no best way to deliver 
financial education; it depends on the target group, objectives 
of a financial-literacy initiative, and available resources. Mass 
media—including television, street theater, call-in radio, or printed 
materials, such as posters and comics—is being used increasingly to 
expose poor and often illiterate people to key financial messages. 
Its primary impact is to spread awareness, whereas the purpose 
of face-to-face training and counseling is to provide participants 
with hands-on experience, particularly with banks, which they tend 
to distrust and fear. More fundamental changes in attitudes and 
behaviors require reinforced messaging over time.
Providers of financial education have differing interests, which 
translates into a diversity of delivery approaches. Central bankers 
or regulators who wish to protect consumers from fraud and abuse 
tend to give priority to public campaigns focused on consumers’ 
rights and responsibilities. Financial institutions that aim to increase 
adoption and use of their products and services may choose to 
integrate financial-education messages into their marketing 
agendas. Community-based organizations wishing to promote 
livelihoods and asset building for the poor may integrate financial 
education into a range of activities, including extension services, 
health education, business-development training, or mentoring. 
Consumer-protection organizations may embrace financial 
education as part of social-marketing campaigns, community-based 
training, or one-on-one counseling at debt advisory centers.
The choice of delivery systems is very much a question of 
resources. While tangible, direct training is expensive on a large 
scale, bundling delivery channels—for example, combining radio 
with some direct training offers—can help strike a balance between 
achieving both broad and focused impacts.
Outcomes and impact
Controversy surrounds the issues of what and how to measure 
the outcomes and impact of financial education. (See Figure 1 in 
Appendix A for one such approach.)
Currently, quantitative evidence of the positive outcomes 
and impacts of financial education is limited. This contrasts with 
affirmative anecdotal evidence from learners. Meanwhile, research 
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Financial Literacy
Monique Cohenshows that financially literate clients make better financial decisions 
and maintain a better overall financial well-being (Cole and 
Fernando 2008).
Recent research linking financial education to behavior 
changes among low-income microfinance clients in Bolivia and 
Sri Lanka provides insights into these contradictory impact-related 
observations. Two years after receiving financial education, clients 
increased their knowledge of loan products and debt capacity. 
Positive changes in savings behaviors included reducing expenses 
as well as recognizing the value of saving three times the amount 
of monthly income for emergency purposes. Those given budgeting 
training identified the primary function and different parts of a 
budget and were able to work within their own budgets. However, 
putting debt-management and savings behaviors into practice 
during the food and financial crises that affected these countries 
was a challenge. The new savings behaviors translated into reduced 
vulnerability (Gray et al. 2010).
To assess the outcomes of financial education, researchers must 
look beyond indicators of behavior change. They must recognize 
that financial behaviors are influenced by the context in which 
people live—both inside and outside the household—and thus are 
ever changing. According to Gray et al. (2010), the five elements of 
effective financial education are
•  quality and frequency of education,
•  relevance of the education to the target population,
•  opportunity to use the education,
•  context in which people can exercise their new financial 
behaviors, and
•  appropriateness of the financial products offered.
Developing a financial education agenda
Since 2002, Microfinance Opportunities (MFO) has sought to put 
financial education on the agenda of microfinance institutions 
and other development organizations seeking to improve the 
financial lives of the poor. To this end, MFO partnered with Freedom 
from Hunger to develop a global financial-education curriculum 
that is targeted at those just above and below the poverty line in 
developing countries. Developed in partnership with nearly  
20 microfinance service providers, the curriculum currently 
addresses ten themes. The core topics are budgeting, saving, 
managing debt, negotiating financial transactions, and using bank 
services. Each theme includes (1) a content note that provides a 
topic overview, (2) a trainer’s guide with step-by-step instructions 
for conducting each learning session, and (3) a “training of trainers” 
manual to prepare financial-education trainers.
The trainer’s guide, the cornerstone of the curriculum, has 
proven itself a valued reference tool. The curriculum itself is flexible 
and readily adaptable to longer or shorter learning activities, 
different contexts, and target populations, including people who are 
illiterate (Nelson and Wambugu 2008). The base curriculum has been 
expanded to encompass a number of specialized modules focused 
on particular financial products (including insurance, remittances, 
and housing loans), specific target groups (for example, adolescent 
girls) and consumer protection. By leveraging partnerships and 
using scalable delivery channels, Microfinance Opportunities is 
achieving significant levels of outreach; in less than three years, 
more than 500,000 consumers have received direct training. This 
figure does not include the enormous outreach achieved through 
the viral spread and adaptations of the MFO curriculum using mass 
media. For example, Makutano Junction, a televised series in East 
Africa, has incorporated the key messages into several episodes. Its 
viewers are in the millions.
Where do we go from here?
Financial education is beginning to get the visibility and interest it 
deserves. Attention is moving beyond the implementation of small-
scale initiatives to the development of national financial-literacy 
strategies that straddle financial and social policies. Integration of 
financial education into cash-transfer programs and branchless 
banking are other emerging programmatic areas. Measuring how 
and when financial education translates into financial-behavior 
change remains difficult, but, among learners, it is valued and 
has emerged as a key—although often overlooked—component of 
economic empowerment.
Some see the challenge of scalability as an obstacle to a 
meaningful impact of financial education. It need not depend 
on stakeholders’ objectives for financial education. Everyone 
can benefit from financial education: the banked, unbanked, or 
underbanked. Technology offers just one avenue to send key 
messages to large numbers of people; its spread therefore must 
not be restricted to users of formal financial services. Building 
financial capabilities among the low-income population is a win–
win situation for the financial sector because it creates better-
informed consumers. Financial education need not be a stand-alone 
activity. It is very effective when combined with other development 
interventions aimed at reducing vulnerability and food insecurity 
and expanding opportunities for the poor.  n
See more information at www.microfinanceopportunities.
org.
For further reading: S. Cole and N. Fernando, “Assessing 
the Importance of Financial Literacy,” ADB Finance for the 
Poor Vol. 9 (No. 3): 2008; B. Gray, J. Sebstad, M. Cohen, and 
K. Stack “Can Financial Education Change Behavior?: Les-
sons from Bolivia and Sri Lanka,” Working Paper 4 (Micro-
finance Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: 2010); C. Nelson 
and A. Wambugu, Financial Education in Kenya: Scoping 
Exercise Report (Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, Nairobi, 
Kenya: 2008); A. Klincic, “Case Study of Opportunity Bank 
of Malawi” (Microfinance Opportunities, Washington, D.C.: 
Forthcoming); R. Pande, E. Field, and S. Jayachandran, Busi-
ness Training and MFI Client Behavior: Findings from a Ran-
domised Impact Evaluation in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (Institute 
for Financial Management and Research (IFMR) Centre for 
Micro Finance, Chennai, India: 2009).
Monique Cohen (moniquec@mfopps.org) is the president of Microfinance Opportunities.
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ommunity-based financial organizations (CBFOs) are user-
owned and -operated groups that provide mainly saving and 
lending services but may also offer other financial services such 
as insurance. These independent organizations are based in local 
communities, with local governance and management. CBFOs range 
in size. They can take the form of informal and unregistered groups 
of five to seven people, usually women, who meet weekly to save 
small amounts of money that they then lend to each other and 
possibly to other members of the community. They also include 
larger, slightly more formal groups of up to 40 people who have 
written by-laws, and they include small financial cooperatives. CBFOs 
flourish among people who have poor access to banks and nonbank 
financial institutions such as microfinance institutions (MFIs).
Market niche
The market niche served by CBFOs is the unbanked poor. In many 
countries, locally organized CBFOs, such as rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAs), have served as financial intermediaries 
for their communities for generations. ROSCA members save a 
predetermined amount of money regularly. In each period, one 
member of the ROSCA receives the funds collected. ROSCAs thus 
allow people to accumulate, through small regular savings, a large 
lump sum that is available for investments, such as creation or 
expansion of small businesses, children’s education, and home 
improvement. The main drawback of ROSCAs is that the money may 
not be available when needed because only one member collects the 
funds at one time.
Although MFIs formed over the past four decades have done a 
great deal to make financial services available to the unbanked poor, 
they have not, for the most part, been able to reach the poorest 
people, especially those who live in remote rural areas. The poorest 
are able to save and borrow only very small amounts of money, 
making it too costly for banks and MFIs to serve them. In remote 
rural areas with widely dispersed populations, banks and MFIs often 
cannot cover the costs of an extension agent or a branch office, 
even if they use modern technologies to reduce costs or group 
people together to achieve economies of scale. Thus, MFIs have 
been successful in broadening the number of people served but less 
successful in reaching the poorest.
Successful models
Experience has shown that successful CBFO models must 
incorporate a number of basic principles: social cohesion of group 
members, a focus on building up savings to fund loans rather than 
relying primarily on external sources of funds, and an organizational 
structure that enables governance and management by people who 
are often poorly educated and have little or no experience with 
financial management beyond managing their own households and 
economic activities. Two models in particular appear to work well on 
a large scale and have good prospects for long-term sustainability.
One model is the village savings and loan association (VSLA) 
model. Started in Niger by CARE International in 1991, the VSLA 
adopted lessons from the efforts of poor local women to save in 
this large, poor, sparsely populated country. Since then, CARE and 
other nonprofit development agencies have spread the model to 
39 countries, the vast majority in Africa. VSLA groups, consisting of 
between 10 and 30 members, have simple rules that govern their 
savings and lending activities. Each member saves on a regular 
basis, and this money is then lent out at an interest rate and on loan 
terms decided by the group. Loans may be made to both members 
and nonmembers. Indeed, many members save but do not borrow 
and earn a good return on their investment through the interest 
charged to borrowers. At the end of a given period, usually a year, 
the savings and the interest the VSLA earned are distributed to the 
members, and a new cycle begins. The distribution feature of this 
model keeps the amounts of money that the members must manage 
at a level commensurate with their financial literacy. It also enables 
all members to receive a lump sum on the same date, often one that 
coincides with most members’ need for funds, such as an annual 
festival, the start of the planting season, or the date that school 
fees must be paid. VSLAs do not generally link with banks or MFIs 
because experience has shown that members’ savings are generally 
sufficient to meet their credit needs, and injection of external loan 
funds has caused many groups to fail.
The self-help group (SHG) model, begun in India several 
decades ago, has become the dominant microfinance model in that 
country, especially for the rural poor. SHGs usually have between 
10 and 20 members who save regularly and lend the money out to 
members only. The funds saved are not distributed back to members, 
but, rather, grow over time. SHGs in India often receive small 
amounts of seed capital from government or donors. They usually 
have an explicit goal of bank linkage, which has been facilitated 
by the high density of banks in rural areas and by a government 
policy stipulating that banks’ portfolios must include rural loans. 
Many SHGs belong to federations that provide them with access to 
external capital, technical assistance in areas such as accounting, 
and greater bargaining power with government and banks. As of 
2007, India had approximately 69,000 SHG federations.
The principal differences between the models are the following:
•  VSLAs are self-contained at the village level, whereas SHGs link 
with banks and form federations with other villages.
•  VSLAs distribute all savings and earnings back to members at 
the end of the year, whereas SHGs add new savings to existing 
savings with no automatic distribution mechanism. This 
difference makes VSLAs easier for nonliterate people to manage 
but allows SHGs to accumulate more capital for lending.
Matching CBFO models with communities’ needs
The design of a CBFO program should be responsive to prevailing 
local conditions. A number of factors should be taken into 
consideration, including the demand for financial services and the 
proximity of banks and MFIs. In poor rural areas with weak local 
economies dominated by subsistence farming and few new business 
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to manage their financial resources. Savers are able to earn a return 
on their investment by making their capital available to those with 
viable businesses. If banks and MFIs are distant, as in the rural areas 
of many African countries, attempting to foster bank linkage may be 
more expensive than is warranted by the limited demand for loans.
In areas with more vibrant economies and greater population 
density, the bank linkage and federation aspects of the SHG 
model enable groups to draw on external funds for the growth 
of members’ businesses. Federations can help SHGs with financial 
management and may also offer training aimed at strengthening 
the SHGs. However, because both the bank linkage and federation 
aspects of the SHG model add significant levels of complexity, 
external support from a technical-assistance provider may be 
required for a long period of time.
Both VSLAs and SHGs are initially formed and nurtured by 
trained extension agents. Experience with both models has shown 
that once the model has been established in a particular area, 
setting up new groups can be less expensive because members of 
existing groups can spread the model to other communities through 
informal linkages between communities or through the formation 
of associations of trainers who are themselves group members. 
Leveraging finance and partnerships  
with mainstream financial institutions
The question of external financing has generated great debate. Many 
CBFOs have failed following the infusion of donor or government 
funds into fragile young organizations lacking the skills to manage 
this money. External credit may also draw into the membership 
people whose main objective is to obtain a slice of donor largesse 
rather than to contribute to the slow but steady buildup of the 
group through its own efforts. Yet it is precisely these efforts that 
are needed to build effective governance and management.
Nevertheless, partnerships between CBFOs and mainstream 
financial institutions can be beneficial, especially if implemented 
incrementally. In the simplest form of partnership, CBFOs may 
bank their excess savings and earn interest on these savings. As the 
relationship develops, the bank or MFI is able to assess the capacity 
of the CBFO to manage its own funds. In a World Bank–supported 
project in Sri Lanka, rural banks have been eager to develop 
relationships with CBFOs, which provide banks with easy access to a 
large number of rural customers. In some cases, the banks have sent 
their representatives to the villages to open the bank accounts. Such 
confidence-building measures can, over time, lead to a willingness 
on the part of the bank or MFI to extend credit to either the CBFO 
(for on-lending to its members) or to individual members who have 
viable business plans. 
The way forward
The ability of CBFOs to govern themselves effectively and to 
manage their operations so that savings are secure and loans are 
repaid is paramount for their long-term sustainability. Donors 
and government can add value by funding programs that train 
local people to develop viable groups and by providing technical 
assistance for the development of simple governance, operational, 
and accounting systems that can be implemented locally.
Donors and governments should also fund program 
evaluations, using performance criteria that allow comparison 
across programs and models. The single most important 
performance indicator is repayment performance—that is, the 
ability of CBFOs to get borrowers to repay their loans in a timely 
way. Nonrepayment of loans is the greatest threat to the financial 
sustainability of any financial organization, including CBFOs. This 
threat is increased by the tendency of donors and governments to 
provide CBFOs with large loan funds that are beyond their capacity 
to manage effectively. Significant amounts of external funding—
beyond small seed funds that help groups get started—should be 
linked to their performance in managing the group’s own funds. This 
careful approach will enable CBFOs to develop a strong foundation 
that enhances their prospects for long-term sustainability.  n
For further reading: J. Murray and R. Rosenberg, Commu-
nity-Managed Loan Funds: Which Ones Work? Focus Note 
No. 36 (Washington, DC: Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 2006), www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.2577/; 
A. Ritchie, Community-Based Financial Organizations: A 
Solution to Access in Remote Rural Areas? Agriculture 
and Rural Development Discussion Paper 34 (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2007); APMAS, www.apmas.org/; Gemi 
Diriya Foundation, www.gamaneguma.lk/sub_link_view.
php?doc=19; VSL Associates, www.vsla.net/.
Anne Ritchie (AnneFRitchie@aol.com) is a World Bank microfinance consultant.
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any people in the vast rural areas of Africa lack access 
to financial services, and most commercial banks are not 
interested in moving into these areas due to their low income levels, 
lack of scale economies, and poor infrastructure. Also, few banks 
actually understand the most common economic activity in rural 
areas: agriculture.
Consequently, the absence of financial institutions in rural 
Africa has often enticed governments to step in, particularly with 
state-dominated banks focused on agriculture. Many of these 
initiatives have failed, however, because they were too bureaucratic, 
too policy oriented, too concentrated on risk to only one segment 
of the population, or too weak in customer focus. In addition, 
clients considered these government-sponsored institutions to be 
instruments that provided grants; hence, the banks suffered from 
poor loan-recovery rates.
While microfinance institutions have made some inroads 
into rural Africa with the financial backing of international 
nongovernmental organizations and other sponsors, their 
sustainability is questionable. They tend to lack banking licenses and 
therefore have a very limited product range, and they cannot afford 
modern technology-based distribution systems.
Key gaps in rural banking in Africa
One of the most prominent gaps in developing banking services for 
rural Africa is poor infrastructure—for example, bad roads, erratic 
electricity provision, and lack of communications systems—which 
impedes effective outreach to customers.
The legal environment in these rural areas is also suspect. 
Insecure property rights—especially land titles in rural areas—limit 
any bank’s collateral options; combined with poor contract-
enforcement opportunities, this takes away a bank’s incentive 
to provide credit, especially for long-term loans. Proper land 
registration and enforceable mortgage systems are important issues 
for rural development.
The inefficiency of markets is also a barrier to developing 
rural financial services. Agricultural value chains are often poorly 
organized, lacking in transparent pricing, and fragmented in primary 
production—all of which results in high transaction costs. In many 
cases, the banking environment is distorted by stakeholders—
including donors, governments, and development banks—who do 
not always regard agriculture as an economic activity, but rather 
as a social problem. These stakeholders provide subsidized funding 
to farmers or cooperatives, which means private banks often lack 
a level playing field. Poor financial literacy rates, especially among 
small farmers, and a limited understanding of banking requirements 
also pose a problem.
Rabo Development
In an effort to serve the financial needs of emerging markets and 
developing countries, Rabo Development (RD) was created with a 
mission similar to that of its parent organization, Rabobank, which 
was created by farmers in the Netherlands more than one hundred 
years ago. In order to achieve its mission of providing access to 
financial services to those in rural areas of developing countries, 
RD participates in financial institutions and provides management 
services and technical assistance. It has made investments in 
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Paraguay, Brazil, and 
China. RD also works with cooperative “enterprises” and financial 
institutions that want to increase their own access to financial 
services. While RD focuses on investments, Rabo International 
Advisory Services (RIAS) provides technical assistance. RIAS has 
a 20-year history in consultancy services mainly to financial 
institutions and cooperatives in emerging markets.
Rabo Development has made investments in some existing 
financial institutions with the objective to transform these 
organizations into leading banks with a rural orientation. Financial 
participation is limited to minority stakes (variation between  
10 and 45 percent); the majority of shares are locally owned, thereby 
retaining the status of a local bank. This allows customers to better 
identify themselves with the institution and appeals to national pride.
Financial investment demands a shared vision of the future 
development of an institution, so stakeholders should agree on 
a mission and business plan, which are likely to entail servicing 
new customer segments, including rural clients (mainly farmers), 
and developing a broader product base. In order to assist 
implementation, Rabo Development not only provides capital but 
also management services, technical assistance, and representation 
on the board of directors. At present, Rabo Development has four 
investments in banks in Africa, which have a total of more than  
3 million customers collectively.
There is no standard recipe for exactly how capacity should be 
built because it very much depends on each individual institution’s 
stage of development and the country concerned. In any case, 
however, special attention should be given to getting the product 
distribution strategy of the institution right. To distinguish customer 
segments and develop their value propositions, it is pivotal to 
organize an efficient outreach, using both physical channels (such 
as branches) and virtual channels (such as ATMs, mobile banking, 
and Internet banking).
Lessons learned
These lessons have been learned by Rabo Development’s work in 
developing countries and emerging markets.
•  Banks with a rural orientation still need a strong urban 
presence, as most banking assets are concentrated in urban 
areas. New distribution concepts, such as mobile banking and 
products, are also normally piloted in urban areas.
•  Banks need to service all client segments with the appropriate 
mix of products (including microloans) in order to effectively 
use the branch network and establish a well-balanced portfolio, 
thereby reducing the concentration of risks.
•  Financial institutions that want to practice rural finance 
need to be committed to this segment and need specialized 
knowledge-based departments, including agriculture and small 
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these target groups. Political pressure has forced institutions in 
some countries to provide rural financial services, but, with no 
commitment, results are poor.
•  Sufficient scale and market share is essential for banks with a 
rural orientation.
•  Client linkage to corporate governance—for example, rural 
and urban client shareholders or client panels—can positively 
influence performance and safeguard the rural mission of  
an institution.
•  Clear client segmentation linked to products and distribution 
channels is essential to effectively delivering products in the 
rural environment.
•  Direct product distribution channels—including mobile-phone 
banking, ATMs, and electronic point-of-sale devices—are 
becoming increasingly important for rural finance delivery. A 
modern and up-to-date IT system is crucial to these services.
•  Rural banks in Africa need to focus on both sides of the balance 
sheet (that is, offer an appropriate mix of savings and lending 
products). Due to a lack of well-operating markets, they need 
to be largely self-financing.
•  Policy instruments based on risk or cost sharing can be 
effective but need to be based on clear client segmentation. 
In cases of sufficient payment capacity, they can be used 
to overcome the lack of enforceable collateral or to make 
the credit itself more enforceable. Clients with insufficient 
payment capacity can only be assisted through income-support 
mechanisms, meaning grants not loans.
The Rabobank approach to financing agriculture
Among the most important lessons Rabo Development has 
learned about building sustainable agrifinance in Africa is that 
segmentation of farmers is essential. In general, a small group of 
commercial farmers is responsible for a large part of a country’s 
agriculture production and exports, and often these farmers are 
the only ones with access to financial services. A large group 
of subsistence farmers who lack sufficient repayment capacity 
for bank loans resides at the bottom of the pyramid. The group 
between the subsistence farmers and the commercial farmers 
consists of both farmers of small cash-crops (for example, coffee, 
cotton, or cocoa) with a low annual marketable surplus and so-
called “emergent” farmers. The latter group has the potential to 
grow into commercial farmers but lacks both the financing and 
farm-management expertise.
Financing small cash-crop farmers is only feasible through 
a supply-chain approach. These smallholders should be financed 
indirectly via contract farming with better-rated “off-takers” (or 
processors). Under such schemes, the farmer commits to supply 
100 percent of a particular crop to the off-taker, and the off-taker 
commits to buy 100 percent of the farmer’s product but pays that 
money directly to the bank, thereby allowing a direct repayment. 
Under these structures, the repayment risk to the individual farmers 
is converted into performance risk to both the farmer and the 
off-taker. In many cases, cooperatives can play a facilitating role 
by being the counterpart of the off-taker and the borrower of 
the loan. A cross-liability system whereby the members guarantee 
one another’s loans could provide extra comfort to the bank. 
Also, systems involving warehouse receipts can provide additional 
financing to this target group; they have been used effectively by 
the banks that Rabo Development has invested in.
Emergent farmers justify an individual approach since they 
have the potential to develop into commercial or professional 
farmers with corresponding growth of financial services. Strict 
criteria need to be established regarding minimum size, sufficient 
entrepreneurial spirit, basic understanding of business planning, and 
farm-management skills. With a combination of financial services 
and technical support, these farmers stand a fair chance of success. 
Emergent farmers can be financed under the existing retail 
structure of a particular bank, but the local branches involved 
would need to hire and train agrifinance specialists who understand 
farming and have the ability to appreciate the particular risks 
associated with it (including, among others, climatic, disease, and 
price risks). It is essential to form alliances with other stakeholders 
in the value chain who also have an interest in developing and 
investing in the farming sector (for example, farmers’ organizations, 
commodity exchanges, agri-input providers, and off-takers).
The main obstacles to financing agriculture are unpredictable 
or erratic government behavior and interference in the agricultural 
sector. This is especially the case in cash crops like coffee, which 
are often important sources of hard currency, and in grains, of 
which African countries are often net importers. In several coffee-
exporting countries, the coffee export is not free but rather 
regulated through auctions with only a limited number of private 
exporters licensed. In grains, prices are often regulated by the 
government to safeguard food security. This comes often at the 
expense of local farmers who are struggling to break even, and it is 
aggravated by relatively high transaction costs and the weak market 
position of African farmers.
Conclusion
The Rabobank approach is strongly focused on the value chain, as 
ultimately the farmer—who runs the price risk, to a large extent—
will only be able to get a fair price when the whole chain operates 
effectively. The success of agricultural development depends on the 
creation of a large group of professional local farmers producing 
high volumes of marketable output at a consistent quality. This will 
have a positive effect on reducing the transaction costs throughout 
the whole value chain. It is also imperative that all those involved 
share a common vision on development and contribute in effective, 
constructive, and committed ways.  n
See more information at www.rabobank.com.
Gerard van Empel (g.j.j.m.empel@rn.rabobank.nl) is general manager of Rabo International Advisory Services and director of Rabo Development. 
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efore the late 1970s, rural dwellers in Ghana had almost no 
access to institutional credit for farm and nonfarm activities, 
and in many rural communities, secure, safe, and convenient savings 
and payment facilities hardly existed. In response to this situation, 
the Government of Ghana took several measures to increase access 
to credit in rural areas, including facilitating the establishment of 
rural and community banks (RCBs). This brief discusses the history 
of RCBs, their business model, their services, and their financial 
performance. It then draws some lessons relevant for others 
involved in or planning similar initiatives.
As a network, RCBs are the largest providers of formal financial 
services in Ghana’s rural areas. By the end of 2008, Ghana had  
127 RCBs with a total 584 service outlets, representing about half of 
the total banking outlets in the country. The RCB network reaches 
about 2.8 million depositors and 680,000 borrowers. Although the 
service delivery performance of the RCB network has been strong, 
its financial performance has been mixed. The profitability and net 
worth of the network have grown, but the financial performance of 
some members has been poor, and a small number are insolvent.
The creation and evolution of the RCBs
The first RCB was established in a farming community in the Central 
region of Ghana in 1976. Several others were established in rapid 
succession, and by 1984 the number of RCBs reached 106. By the 
early 1980s, however, the financial performance of many RCBs 
started to decline for several reasons, including a 1983 drought, 
weak governing ability, conflicts within boards of directors, and 
ineffective management in many RCBs.
The Bank of Ghana, the Ghanaian central bank, undertook 
several reforms to curb the deteriorating situation. Exposure to 
risky sectors (mainly agriculture) was limited, distressed banks 
were closed, supervision was strengthened, and RCB managers and 
boards of directors were offered training. Between 1989 and 1994 
the Government of Ghana, with the support of the World Bank, also 
implemented the Rural Finance Project, aimed at providing targeted 
support to the RCBs. The project contributed to an improvement in 
RCB performance.
Nevertheless, several RCBs remained weak, and in 1998, the 
Bank of Ghana liquidated 23 RCBs. The Government of Ghana, with 
the support of the World Bank and other donors, implemented a 
follow-up project—the Rural Financial Services Project—between 
2001 and 2007 to help further strengthen the RCBs. This project 
provided extensive training to RCBs and supported the establishment 
and strengthening of the Association of Rural Banks (ARB) Apex 
Bank, as a bank to the RCBs. (The Association of Rural Banks had 
been established in the early 1980s as a networking forum for RCBs 
and later started providing training to member RCBs.)
Business model
Small asset base. RCBs are relatively small financial institutions 
with average share capital of GHc 136,526 (US$105,263), average 
deposits of GHc 2.3 million (US$1.77 million), and average assets 
of GHc 3.8 million (US$2.4 million), although values of the three 
indicators vary significantly among RCBs.
Community ownership and governance. RCBs are fully 
owned by shareholders who are residents of communities in which 
they operate. Each rural or community bank has a board of directors 
that is responsible for its strategic governance. Boards are elected 
by owners/shareholders during annual general meetings. Election 
criteria are normally based on reputation in the community and 
professional expertise, but experience in banking is extremely limited.
Professional management and staff. The core management 
staff of a typical RCB is composed of a chief executive officer who is 
in charge of the daily management of the bank; an internal auditor, 
responsible for internal control measures; a finance officer; and 
credit and project officers. Many of the personnel are recruited from 
local communities.
Strategic alliance. Since 2002 the ARB Apex Bank has 
provided specialized services essential to improving the quality 
and scope of products offered by RCBs, and it performs important 
supervisory functions delegated by the Bank of Ghana. Among the 
main services offered by the Apex Bank are check clearing, specie 
supply, treasury management, loan fund mobilization, and domestic 
and international money transfers. The Apex Bank provides most of 
these services on a fee basis.
Legal and regulatory framework. RCBs are incorporated 
as limited liability companies and licensed by the Bank of Ghana 
within the framework of the Banking Act. The minimum level of 
capital required by RCBs is GHc 150,000 (US$116,135). RCBs whose 
capital falls below this minimum are not allowed to pay dividends 
or open new branches or agencies until they attain the minimum 
level of capitalization.
Products and services
Savings. RCB savings products include savings accounts, current 
accounts, susu deposits (small savings collected daily from clients by 
individual collectors going door to door), and fixed or time deposits. 
In a sample of 12 RCBs, regular savings deposits account for about 
58 percent of the total number of clients and 57 percent of the total 
deposit balance. These accounts are small in size and short term. 
Susu is the second-largest account type, representing  
21 percent of total clients, but its share of total deposits is only  
11 percent because of the small size of each account. Fixed and 
special deposits that offer higher interest rates with long-term 
deposit contracts represent only about 1 percent of total clients.
Credit. The credit products offered by RCBs include 
microfinance loans, personal loans, salary loans, susu loans, and 
overdraft facilities. In a sample of 12 RCBs, salary loans amount to 
33 percent of total advances, followed by personal loans  
(24 percent) and microfinance (20 percent). In terms of number of 
borrowers, microfinance accounts for 31 percent of total borrowers 
followed by personal loans (26 percent) and salary loans  
(22 percent). RCB loans are used for agriculture, cottage industries, 
and trading.
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and international money transfers, and government agencies use 
the RCB service outlets for salary and pension deposits. Clearing of 
checks for cocoa purchases is also an important service provided 
under the payment category.
Performance
Steadily increasing outreach and service delivery. Between 2000 
and 2008 the number of depositors in RCBs grew at an average 
annual rate of 14 percent, and the number of borrowers grew at an 
average annual rate of 27 percent. The RCB network reaches about 
2.8 million depositors and 680,000 borrowers, making RCBs the 
largest group of licensed financial service providers in rural areas. 
Clients of RCBs consist mostly of farmers, government employees, 
and small and micro-entrepreneurs.
Mixed financial performance. The profitability and net worth 
of the RCB network steadily increased from 2000 to 2008. Network-
wide capital is well above the minimum 10 percent required by the 
Bank of Ghana. In 2008, however, seven RCBs were insolvent, and 
the continued operation of poorly performing RCBs is a key issue 
facing the network. The relatively high ratio of nonperforming loans 
is another major factor affecting financial performance. In the 
sample RCBs, for example, the proportion of the loan portfolio that 
was in default for more than 30 days was 16 percent, compared 
with 3 percent for banks in their global peer group.
Lessons on rural banking
The case of rural banking in Ghana points to the following lessons:
•  Although community-based financial institutions such as 
the RCBs can play a key role in increasing access to financial 
services in rural areas, their small size can also make it 
challenging for them to become financially sustainable and 
compete with other financial institutions that enter the rural 
financial market. To be successful, they should be able to 
respond dynamically to changes in the business environment. 
These responses may include building linkages, being open to 
mergers, and bringing in external investors, if necessary.
•  Small local financial institutions often cannot easily procure 
needed technical support (such as training and specialized 
technical assistance for product development and setting up 
of operational systems) from the market. Hence, initiatives 
to build local financial institutions must support the creation 
of strategic alliances that can either provide such services or 
facilitate their cost-effective provision. Apex institutions can 
play a crucial role in providing technical and financial services 
to small financial institutions.
•  Apex institutions may find it difficult to achieve financial 
sustainability by providing services to members alone. Such 
institutions may have to also provide services to the public, 
including general commercial banking services. Care must be 
taken, however, to ensure that the business model adopted 
does not compromise the original mission—in this case, to 
increase sustainable provision of financial services in rural areas.
•  The regulator needs to have the necessary skills, political 
autonomy, and financial resources to effectively regulate and 
supervise a large number of small financial institutions that 
are geographically dispersed. Often the central bank does not 
have the skills to undertake this task directly, and alternative 
models of supervision may have to be adopted. Even in the 
best circumstances, however, a certain number of institutions 
will fail, and the regulatory system needs to have the capacity 
to respond quickly to protect depositors and to prevent 
failure from lowering confidence in other institutions. Donor 
funding cannot sustain a supervisory regime in the long run, 
and recovery of all supervision costs through fees from the 
supervised institutions may not be a feasible option. Under these 
circumstances, adequate government funding for supervision 
would be critical for ensuring sustainable service delivery.  n
For further reading: A. Nair and A. Fissha, “Rural Banking: 
The Case of the Rural and Community Banks in Ghana,” 
Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper No. 48 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010).
Ajai Nair (anair@worldbank.org) is program coordinator of the Agriculture Finance Support Facility in the Agriculture and Rural Development Department of 
the World Bank. Azeb Fissha (afissha@worldbank.org) is a consultant with the Agriculture and Rural Development Department of the World Bank.
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redit for investments that pay back in the medium to long 
term (three to five years or longer) is in short supply in rural 
areas. Credit unions and microfinance institutions (MFIs), which 
generally have better outreach than commercial banks in rural 
areas, typically provide only short-term credit. Credit available from 
informal sources (such as moneylenders, family, and friends) is 
usually both short term and too costly for investment financing. For 
rural enterprises seeking to acquire equipment—a typical investment 
need—to modernize production and thereby increase productivity, 
one solution may be financial leasing.
Leasing offers several advantages. For traditional credit, 
farmers and rural enterprises are particularly constrained by a lack 
of assets that can be used as collateral. Leasing overcomes this 
constraint because it requires no collateral or less collateral than 
typically required by loans. Because leases also often require lower 
down payments than the equity required for loans, they are more 
affordable for rural enterprises that have limited funds and little 
access to borrowed funds.
From the lessor’s perspective, not having to obtain collateral 
is particularly advantageous in a rural context. Although the 
difficulties involved in creating, perfecting, and enforcing security 
are applicable in both urban and rural contexts in most developing 
countries, they are more severe in rural areas where enterprises 
are less likely to hold titles to their assets, asset registries are less 
likely to be functional, and judicial processes are likely to be slower. 
Lessors are also likely to benefit from not being restricted by interest 
rate ceilings and sector-specific credit allocations—factors that have 
traditionally constrained rural lenders. Boxes 1 and 2 explain key 
features of a leasing contract, and Figure 1 shows a typical tripartite 
financial lease transaction involving an equipment supplier, a lessor, 
and lessee.
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Box 1—What is a financial lease?
Box 2—Key features of a financial lease contract
Leasing is a contract between two parties, where the party that 
owns an asset (the lessor) lets the other party (the lessee) use the 
asset for a predetermined time in exchange for periodic payments. 
Leasing separates use of an asset from ownership of that asset. 
There are two main categories of leasing: financial leases and 
operating leases.
In a financial lease, lease payments amortize the price of the 
asset. At the end of the lease period, the lessee can purchase the 
asset for a token price. The lessee is responsible for maintenance 
and risk of obsolescence of the asset. Because of the option 
to purchase the asset and the risks transferred to the lessee, a 
financial lease is a close substitute for a loan. Nearly all rural leases 
are financial leases.
In contrast, operating leases do not include the option to 
purchase the asset. Maintenance costs and risk of obsolescence are 
borne by the lessor, and leases are cancelable.
•  Security: The primary security is the leased equipment. In some 
cases a small amount of cash or other asset owned by the 
lessee may be taken as additional security. 
•  Insurance: The lessor insures leased assets with commercial 
insurance and includes the cost in the lease price. 
•  Lease term: Lease terms range from two to five years. 
•  Lease cost: It includes cost of insurance, operating cost, loss 
provision, and profit.
•  Lease payment schedule: The payment schedule can be monthly, 
quarterly, half-yearly, or annual. 
•  Option to purchase: On completion of the lease payments, 
lessees have the option to purchase the leased assets at a 













Figure 1—Financial lease transaction
Source: IFC (International Finance Corporation), Leasing in Development: 
Guidelines for Emerging Economies (Washington, DC, 2009).
1.  Initial negotiations about model, specification, price, 
discounts, warranty, delivery, etc. At this time the method 
of payment for the asset may not have been discussed.
2.  Request for a leasing quotation (the supplier may also 
provide quotations on behalf of lessors).
3.  Purchase contract agreement signed between lessor and 
supplier based on information supplied by the lessee to 
include those issues in (1) and also payment terms.
4.  Lease contract signed and downpayment paid by lessee.
5.  Invoice created by supplier giving title in asset to lessor 
(assuming full payment received by supplier).
6.  Asset delivered to lessee.
7.  Delivery and acceptance notice (protocol) signed by 
supplier and lessee.
8.  Supplier’s invoice paid by lessor.
9.  Regular lease repayments paid.Rural leasing initiatives 
A 2006 World Bank case study of three profitable providers of 
leasing in rural areas showed that in all three cases the rural 
portfolios were as profitable as their urban portfolios. Arrendadora 
John Deere, the largest provider of farm machinery leases in Mexico, 
had nearly US$63 million in farm equipment leases. DFCU Leasing, 
the largest provider of leases in Uganda, had a US$5 million lease 
portfolio in rural areas. Network Leasing Corporation Limited, a 
leading micro-leasing provider in Pakistan, had a lease portfolio of 
more than US$2.4 million in rural areas. Low lease losses, strong 
client demand for asset financing, and a favorable legal and policy 
environment made rural leasing a profitable business for these 
companies. For clients, access to finance at a reasonable cost, low or 
no collateral requirements, quick processing, and easy access to the 
provider appear to be significant benefits.
Drawing on the experiences of the providers studied, the World 
Bank study identified the following lessons on managing financial 
leasing in rural areas.
•  Rural leasing is a means to acquire productive assets. 
All rural leases provided by the three leasing companies are 
financial leases and were used to finance the acquisition of 
assets (in contrast to renting of assets).
•  Rural enterprises of different sizes benefit from leasing, 
but a provider may not be able to equally serve all 
enterprises. Providers are limited because of differences in the 
skills and capacities required to effectively serve enterprises of 
varying sizes.
•  Nonfarm enterprises account for a significant proportion 
of rural leases.
•  Rural leasing can be profitable, but jump-starting rural 
leasing will require government and donor support. All 
three firms studied benefited from access to government or 
donor funds, particularly in expanding their rural operations.
•  A rural-only leasing company may not be viable. Because 
leasing is a specialized financial activity, economies of scale, 
cost, and risk factors may require that, in most economies, 
leasing companies have larger urban operations.
The challenge: Supporting increased availability 
of leasing in rural areas
Leasing is a viable tool to finance rural assets. The nature and 
capacity of existing financial institutions, the level of potential 
demand for investment finance in rural areas, and the level 
of development of the leasing industry should determine the 
mechanisms for supporting increased access to leasing for rural 
enterprises. Policy-level support will be required in countries that do 
not have a clear legal and regulatory framework for leasing. Such 
support must be sectorwide and not restricted to rural leasing.
A good legal framework for leasing includes (1) clear definitions 
of a lease contract, leased assets, and responsibilities and rights of 
the parties to a lease contract; (2) clarity in allocating responsibility 
for liability for third-party losses arising out of the operation of 
leased assets; (3) stipulation of the priority of a lessor’s claim over 
a leased asset; and (4) a framework for easy and fast repossession 
of leased assets. The use of internationally accepted accounting 
standards and an unbiased tax code enhance the development 
of the leasing sector. The existence of a well-functioning asset 
registry, the availability of insurance and maintenance services for 
equipment at a reasonable cost, and the existence of a good market 
for used assets are also necessary for the development of the 
financial leasing industry.
Targeted institutional support may also be needed to help 
develop the rural leasing sector. As shown in Boxes 1 and 2 and 
Figure 1, financial leasing is a relatively complex transaction. To 
successfully undertake financial leasing operations, organizations 
need not only well-trained staff, but also high-quality lease 
origination processes, accounting and internal control systems, 
and overall portfolio risk management. Types of institutional-
level support that can help include (1) subsidies for startup costs 
of leasing operations to help offset the higher transaction cost 
and risk of operating in rural areas; (2) funding to establish links 
between commercial providers and community-based or nonprofit 
organizations to increase scale; (3) technical support to leasing 
companies; and (4) provision of equity, loans, or guarantees to 
expand rural outreach.
A wide range of organizations—leasing companies, banks, 
financial cooperatives, microfinance organizations, and equipment-
selling companies—could benefit from such support. Institutional-
level support can include capital support when access to long-
term funds is a critical constraint. Capital support combined with 
technical assistance can help leasing firms develop access to 
sustainable sources of capital.  n
For further reading: IFC (International Finance Corpo-
ration), Leasing in Development: Guidelines for Emerging 
Economies (Washington, DC, 2009), available at www.IFC.
org; A. Nair and R. Kloeppinger-Todd, “Buffalo, Baker-
ies, and Tractors: Cases in Rural Leasing from Pakistan, 
Uganda, and Mexico” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2006), available at www.worldbank.org/rural; A. Nair, R. 
Kloeppinger-Todd, and A. Mulder, “Leasing: An Underuti-
lized Tool in Rural Finance,” World Bank Agricultural and 
Rural Development Discussion Paper No. 7 (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2004), available at www.worldbank.org/
rural; G. D. Westley, Equipment Leasing and Lending: A Guide 
for Micro-Finance, Best Practice Series (Washington, DC: 
Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Develop-
ment Department, 2003).
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ince the establishment of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
in 1976, microfinance has boomed. As of December 31, 2007, 
3,552 microcredit institutions had reached 154 million clients 
worldwide, about 106.6 million of whom were among the poorest 
when they took their first loan. Such expansion can be at least 
partly attributed to the widely adopted practice of group lending 
in microfinance programs. In contrast to individual lending, group 
lending (or joint liability) grants a loan to a group of borrowers, 
and the whole group is liable for the debt of any individual member 
in the group. This practice allows microfinance programs to rely 
mainly on accountability and mutual trust among group members 
rather than financial collateral to insure against default. Given that 
the poor often lack appropriate financial collateral, group lending 
programs offer a feasible way of extending credit to poor people 
who are usually kept out of traditional banking systems.
There is considerable debate about whether such groups can be 
sustainable, achieving sound repayment performance while serving 
poor borrowers. The factors affecting repayment performance are 
thus of great policy relevance. This brief examines whether and 
how much repayment is affected by three factors: the source of 
the loan, groups’ provision of public goods in the form of insurance 
substitutes, and the monitoring and repayment rules of the 
federations of groups. The data come from more than  
2,000 self-help groups (SHGs), federated in 299 village organizations 
in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The SHGs under study were 
supported by a large World Bank program called the Indira Kranti 
Patham (IKP) program, with a cost of US$260 million. The program 
has been replicated in other states in India and may be replicated 
in other countries. A better understanding of factors influencing 
repayment will therefore help improve the performance and 
advance of the program.
Background of the IKP program
Building on Andhra Pradesh’s tradition of SHGs, the IKP program 
was launched in October 2000 to promote the formation of new 
groups and to strengthen existing ones. A typical program SHG 
consists of 10–20 women members who meet regularly to discuss 
social issues and engage in social activities. During these meetings 
each member deposits a small thrift payment into a joint bank 
account. Once enough savings have been accumulated, group 
members can apply for internal loans that draw on accumulated 
savings at an interest rate to be determined by the group. Once 
the group establishes a record of internal saving and repayment, 
it becomes eligible for loans through a commercial bank or IKP 
program funds.
An important component of the program is to support the 
federation of SHGs at the village and mandal (block/county) 
level through formation of village organizations and county 
organizations. The purpose of federation is to capitalize on 
economies of scale in capacity building, credit, and insurance and to 
ensure that public programs reach the poor. Although IKP program 
funds were initially made available to SHGs, they were shifted to 
village organizations and later to county organizations as soon as 
these were established.
The survey
Data for this study come from a survey of 299 village organizations 
conducted by the World Bank in 2006. This brief investigates  
3,350 expired loans made to members of 2,147 SHGs. In the survey, 
all loans taken by each member SHG in the village organizations 
between June 2003 and June 2006 were recorded from account 
books of each organization. The study period started after the 
majority of village organizations were formed and coincided with 
a major drive for SHG formation. Of the 40 million rupees (about 
US$1 million) of aggregate loan principal, about 60 percent of the 
funds were provided by the IKP program, with the rest of the funds 
coming from banks, SHGs, and other sources. Only 63 percent of 
loans from the IKP program were fully repaid, compared with  
87 percent repayment for bank loans and 89 percent repayment for 
internal loans.
The survey provides information on loan terms (size, 
source, length, interest rate, and repayment frequency), SHG 
characteristics (size, age, and membership composition), and village 
organizations’ monitoring and repayment rules. These rules differ 
in four key dimensions:
•  Delinquency management policies. These policies include fees 
to SHGs that miss an installment and loan recovery committees 
to monitor SHGs’ creditworthiness (through a rating system, for 
example). Both would likely increase repayment probability.
•  Monitoring of SHGs’ financial affairs. Here, the study looks at 
three variables: whether the village organization (1) regularly 
inspects member SHGs’ books at monthly meetings; (2) employs 
a trained bookkeeper; and (3) regularly audits members’ books. 
Again, all of these steps should help reduce defaults.
•  The extent to which the village organization provides public 
goods. The study considers whether in-kind rice credit and 
marketing services are provided. The in-kind rice credit is a 
program whereby the village organization acquires subsidized 
rice in bulk under the public distribution scheme and makes it 
available to SHG members as an in-kind credit, with any savings 
from the bulk purchase passed on to members in the form of 
lower prices. Marketing services are the collective activities that 
help SHG members gain access to markets—for example, buying 
and selling in bulk to obtain more favorable prices or to reduce 
transaction costs. Because such benefits can be cut off in case 
of default, they should enhance repayment incentives, especially 
when alternative sources for these benefits are unavailable. 
•  The extent to which SHGs are required to deposit regular 
thrift payments with the village organization. The village 
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cash collateral that can be withheld in case of default and thus 
should increase repayment incentives.
In the sample of 299 village organizations, 36 percent applied 
a sanction for SHGs that miss an installment, 41 percent had a 
loan-recovery committee, 35 percent provided in-kind consumption 
credit, 25 percent provided marketing services, 47 percent 
collected thrift from their member SHGs, 82 percent employed 
trained bookkeepers, 37 percent of the SHGs in the sample were 
regularly audited, and 23 percent presented their books at village 
organization meetings.
Factors influencing loan repayment
The model used to estimate the effects of various factors on 
repayment shows that monitoring and loan recovery arrangements 
are highly significant, both statistically and economically. Regular 
audits, checking of SHG books at village organization meetings, 
and depositing of SHG savings with the village organization 
are estimated to increase the probability of full repayment by 
8.3, 9.5, and 20 percentage points, respectively. Although the 
village organization’s involvement in marketing has no impact on 
repayment, in-kind consumption credit is predicted to increase the 
probability of full payment by 12.7 points, suggesting that non-
economic benefits from credit groups increase repayment incentives. 
This finding also implies that village organizations are better 
positioned to help smooth consumption and address credit market 
imperfections than to intervene in output markets.
The results also suggest that SHGs are more likely to fully repay 
loans from banks—by 18.6 points according to the estimate—than 
loans from the IKP program. The program’s lower repayment rate 
points to limits in village organizations’ credibility, possibly because 
of their relatively recent establishment. High installment frequency 
has an almost equally large effect (15 points), consistent with 
the notion that frequent small installments enhance repayment 
performance for households with credit constraints. As have other 
studies, this study found that full repayment is less likely for loans 
with longer duration and, less significantly, higher interest.
Other studies have found mixed evidence on the impact of 
group characteristics, but the results of this study suggest that 
the probability of repayment increases with the size of the group 
up to about 14 members and decreases thereafter. In contrast, 
the probability of repayment decreases with the length of time 
the group has been in operation up to about five years. Although 
groups with a high percentage of poor individuals show lower rates 
of full repayment, the magnitude is small: a 10-point increase in 
very poor members would reduce full repayment by only  
1.7 points. Here the trade-off between sustainability and service to 
the poorest is much smaller than suggested by some other studies. 
Neither caste composition nor homogeneity has a significant 
impact on repayment. 
Summary and policy implications
In contrast to most existing literature that studies the effects of 
group and individual attributes on loan repayment in microcredit 
groups, this study investigates the effects of exogenous monitoring 
and loan recovery arrangements, together with loan and group 
characteristics. Because banks and others can provide microfinance 
institutions with additional resources contingent on adoption of 
certain minimum rules, the findings from this study could be of 
great practical relevance. The results highlight the following four 
policy implications:
1. Repayment rates are significantly lower on loans originating 
in externally provided grant resources managed by village 
organizations. This finding highlights the need for further 
inquiry on why this is the case and how to improve the 
repayment performance of loans from grant resources. 
2. Among SHGs, external management policies (such as regular 
monitoring and audits and in-kind consumption credit) and 
loan terms (group savings deposits with the lender, frequency 
of repayment) appear far more important to full repayment 
than group characteristics such as the poverty level of 
members. This result suggests that, in this context, even 
groups composed of very poor borrowers can achieve high 
repayment rates if village organizations adopt proper rules 
and management practices. Furthermore, SHG federations and 
other external group supervisors should consider implementing 
the management policies that can encourage full repayment.
3. Third, the results suggest that the optimal size of a group is 
about 14 members. This finding can provide some guidance in 
group formation.  n
For further reading: C. Ahlin and R. M. Townsend, “Using 
Repayment Data to Test across Models of Joint Liability 
Lending,” Economic Journal 117, no. 2 (2007): F11–51; R. Cull, 
A. Demirguc-Kunt, and J. Morduch, “Financial Performance 
and Outreach: A Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks,” 
Economic Journal 117, no. 2 (2007): F107–33; M. Sharma and 
M. Zeller, “Repayment Performance in Group-Based Credit 
Programs in Bangladesh: An Empirical Analysis,” World 
Development 25, no. 10 (1997): 1731–42.
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ver the past three years, payment strategies for emerging 
markets have been revolutionized by the advent of a simple 
cell-phone-based payment service in Kenya called M-PESA (“M” 
for “mobile” and “pesa” for “money”). From a small-scale pilot 
program in 2006, M-PESA has become an outstanding success in 
Kenya; customer response has been unprecedented. Currently, more 
than 9 million Kenyans use M-PESA to perform tens of millions of 
transactions every month throughout the country. Although this 
success has led to new opportunities, it has also brought about 
many unforeseen challenges.
What is M-PESA?
Vodafone, the world’s leading international mobile communications 
group, based in the United Kingdom, originally developed M-PESA 
with funding from the Department for International Development 
(DFID) as a pilot program to extend the growth of financial markets 
to the unbanked (people without access to conventional banking 
services) in East Africa. In March 2007, M-PESA was launched 
in Kenya in partnership with Safaricom, Kenya’s leading mobile 
telecommunications company. It quickly became clear by the 
demand from the unbanked that this cell-phone-based, money-
transfer business was a welcome commercial opportunity across 
Africa and elsewhere. 
In emerging economies, it is common for some wage earners 
to work away from home and send domestic remittances back 
to their extended families in rural areas. The initial focus of 
M-PESA, therefore, was to enable these workers to send money 
home via faster, safer, and more affordable means than those 
previously available to them. M-PESA allows customers to send 
money home (and make a variety of other payments, described 
below) without a bank account. People can begin using the 
system simply by registering for free at certified M-PESA agents, 
which include retailers such as supermarkets, gas stations, and 
shops that sell prepaid airtime cards. In fact, several banks have 
even become M-PESA agents. Customers can use cash to “buy” 
electronic money (e-money) from an agent, then use their phones 
to perform financial transactions (for example, to send money to 
another person or buy additional airtime). The e-money can also be 
converted into cash by selling it back to an agent. Agents are paid 
a commission for providing cash-in and cash-out services and for 
registering customers.
Transaction values are typically low; M-PESA moves smaller 
amounts of money than banks would normally service. As M-PESA 
gains acceptance, however, it is also becoming attractive to people 
who already have bank accounts as a way to pay out wages to, 
for example, tradesmen and household staff—who are, of course, 
M-PESA’s targeted customers.
M-PESA: Beyond “sending money home”
There is no doubt that giving M-PESA customers the ability to send 
money home was a feature that filled a gap in the market. Within 
two years, M-PESA had become the most frequently used money-
transfer mechanism (see Figure 1 in Appendix A).
The need for fast, safe money transfers, particularly to those 
in rural communities, is obvious; and the benefits have been 
much reported in the Kenyan press and by nongovernmental 
organizations. However, by extending functionality and thinking 
laterally, M-PESA has been expanded to further serve the unbanked 
of Kenya.
Bill payments
The option for customers to pay their bills via cell phone was 
recently added to the M-PESA menu. Designed to allow people to 
pay their regular bills—such as utilities, school fees, and rent—this 
feature has become a means of payment collection for many other 
businesses as well. Of particular relevance to rural communities, 
even the provision of clean drinking water has been improved 
through the use of M-PESA. Grundfoss, a Danish company, 
developed an entrepreneurial solar-powered metering system to 
pump clean water from boreholes into rural areas. Pumps can be 
paid for by a “smart card” (a prepaid card with a memory chip), but 
finding means to apply credit to these smart cards in the rural areas 
where water pumps were situated was a problem—until M-PESA 
arrived. Customers sent money to Grundfoss using the “Pay Bill” 
feature, and their smart card was automatically credited and ready 
to use. This payment system is now available wherever Grundfoss 
water pumps are deployed.
Additionally, several microfinance institutions (MFIs) are now 
using M-PESA’s bill-paying feature for loan repayment collection. 
This eliminates the time loan recipients used to spend travelling 
to urban areas to deposit cash into their MFI bank accounts; this 
time can now be better spent attending to their farms or small 
businesses. Similarly, insurance and microinsurance premiums can 
now be paid using M-PESA.
Business payments
The “Business Payments” feature allows a business to pay a number 
of customers or employees through their M-PESA accounts. This 
service was originally introduced at the request of Safaricom’s 
temporary staff working in rural areas. These low-income workers 
previously had to travel to a Safaricom office in the nearest town to 
pick up their paychecks and deposit them into bank accounts; it was 
a time-consuming activity at best. Now they receive their wages 
directly through their M-PESA accounts. It has proven so popular 
that the organization recruited to provide M-PESA training to new 
agents around Kenya actually started to use the payment feature 
for its own staff expenses. Many other companies are now using 
M-PESA to pay field operatives working remotely from regional 
offices. Safaricom also recently offered shareholders the opportunity 
to receive their annual dividend payments via M-PESA; many 
thousands of Kenyans—who had become first-time shareholders 
when Safaricom issued public shares in 2008—accepted the offer.
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In rural areas, the only suitable outlets to become M-PESA agents 
are often small family-run stores. While it is not commercially 
feasible for M-PESA to have a direct business relationship with 
thousands of “Mom-and-Pop” shops across Kenya, a partnership 
of some kind would be advantageous to all parties. To resolve this 
conundrum, M-PESA created the aggregator model in which a 
distributor is appointed to recruit and manage agents in these small 
stores and in return gets a share of the M-PESA commission earned 
by that store.
To further accommodate the growing system, M-PESA had to 
address the issue that when an agent runs out of “float”—either 
e-money or cash—they cannot service their customers. With the 
huge expansion, getting more e-money into the system was a 
requirement and, oftentimes, a challenge since conventional 
banking takes some time to clear deposits before new e-money 
can be issued, during which time an agent who has run out cannot 
offer M-PESA. To reduce this problem, larger agents rich in cash or 
e-money were given the ability to act as agents to smaller shops. 
Thus, a smaller outlet can now buy or sell e-money from one of 
these larger, richer “super agents.” Float management is a particular 
problem in rural areas where agents tend to net more withdrawals 
than deposits, or, in other words, they tend to be e-money rich but 
cash poor. The capability of these super agents has helped speed up 
the turnaround of e-money and cash, allowing small agents to have 
less money tied up in M-PESA and yet still have more float available.
Bank branches that were reluctant to become regular M-PESA 
agents for customers conducting small transactions have been happy 
to act as super agents for businesses operating with larger sums. 
This also gives these banks the opportunity to promote and sell their 
banking services to more businesses. Many small business owners 
acting as M-PESA agents now have their first ever bank account.
Banking services 
M-PESA is now giving cell-phone users access to formal banking 
services. In May 2010 Safaricom and Equity Bank, a leading bank 
in Kenya, launched an initiative to offer every M-PESA user the 
opportunity to open a savings account. Customers use M-PESA to 
both deposit money into and withdraw money from their savings 
accounts. Called M-KESHO (kesho is Swahili for “tomorrow”), this 
service effectively gives millions of rural Kenyans access to banking 
services for the first time.
M-PESA: Perks and pitfalls
It became clear soon after M-PESA’s launch that the service 
provided an effective and convenient means of making any sort 
of person-to-person money transfer, and subscriber numbers grew 
well beyond projections. Initial predictions estimated 320,000 users 
in the first year of trading: Nine months after launch, M-PESA 
registered its one millionth customer. It was an exciting success. As 
with any new business that unexpectedly finds itself growing much 
faster than anticipated, however, there were numerous implications, 
each with significant costs.
•  Budget flexibility: The rapid growth required a significantly 
reworked budget. For example, customer acquisition costs 
money because agents have to be paid to register customers, 
and the cost of new SIM cards—which are free to new 
customers—needs to be covered. It takes time for new customers 
to become mature users and start generating revenue, so 
signing up more than 10,000 new customers per day had a 
serious impact on cash flow in the early life of the product.
•  Customer support: M-PESA needed a significantly larger call 
center and a lot more customer service representatives than 
were originally anticipated.
•  System capacity: At the time of M-PESA’s launch, the system 
had a technical design that could cope comfortably with 
the original business case plus a sensible safety margin; 
this capacity was rapidly exceeded and had to be regularly 
expanded to include new features at significant expense. 
•  Managing agent demand: A sufficient number of agents had 
to be sought out, enrolled, and trained. As retailers and outlets 
came to understand the business opportunity, however, the 
situation reversed; their demand was such that the Safaricom 
sales office had to cater to the crowds of would-be agents. 
Extra staff members were also required to process applications 
and provide ongoing agent training.
Conclusion
As problems go, those associated with rapid growth are the best 
kind to have, but they are challenging nonetheless. Substantial costs 
were incurred far earlier than anticipated, pushing back the expected 
break-even date. Working on the basis that budget shortfall would 
soon be forgotten while unexpected customer growth would 
be remembered for years to come, M-PESA managed to secure 
additional funds. Now, alongside increasing demand, a critical mass 
of mature customers is growing to support the need for revenue. 
There is still much to do, but as M-PESA approaches its third birthday 
in Kenya, it is well prepared to tackle whatever comes next.  n
See more information at www.safaricom.co.ke/index.
php?id=745. 
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dentity theft is a common crime the world over. In developing 
countries, the damage caused by identity theft and identity fraud 
goes far beyond the individual victim, however, and ultimately 
creates a direct impediment to progress, particularly in credit 
markets. Recent research reveals that biometric technology can help 
reduce these problems.
A biometric is a measurement of physical or behavioral 
characteristics used to verify or analyze identity. Common 
biometrics include a person’s fingerprints; face, iris, or retina 
patterns; speech; or handwritten signature. These are effective 
personal identifiers because they are unique and intrinsic to each 
person, so, unlike conventional identification methods (such as 
passport numbers or government-issued identification cards), they 
cannot be forgotten, lost, or stolen.
Recent advances in recognition technology coupled with 
increases in both digital storage capacity and computer processing 
speeds have made biometric technology (for example, ocular or 
fingerprint scanners) feasible in many applications, from controlling 
restricted building access to allowing more effective delivery of 
targeted government programs with large-scale identification 
systems, such as those being implemented in India by the Unique 
Identification Authority of India.
Biometric technology can also improve access to credit 
and insurance markets, especially in countries that do not have 
a unique identification system, where identity fraud—the use 
of someone else’s identity or a fictitious one—to gain access to 
services otherwise unavailable to an individual is rather common. 
For example, lenders in Malawi describe past borrowers who 
purposefully defaulted then tried to obtain a fresh loan from the 
same or another institution under a false identity. And, although 
less common in developing countries because markets are less 
developed, the potential for sick individuals without healthcare 
coverage to use the insurance policy of a friend or relative does 
exist. The response of lenders and insurance companies has been to 
restrict the supply of such services to the detriment of the greater 
population, not just those people committing identity fraud.
In the case of credit, biometric technology can make the idea of 
future credit denial more than an empty threat by making it easier 
for financial institutions to withhold new loans from past defaulters 
and reward responsible past borrowers with increased credit. As a 
result of this inability to “cheat the system,” individuals may take 
out smaller loans that they are able to repay or avoid borrowing 
altogether if they cannot pay back any debt. Borrowers may have 
greater incentives to ensure that production is successful, either by 
exerting more effort or choosing less risky projects, and—whenever 
production could cover the loan repayment—borrowers may be less 
likely to default intentionally or opportunistically.
To look at the impact of biometric technology, Giné, Goldberg, 
and Yang (2009) implemented a field experiment using  
3,200 smallholder paprika farmers in four locations in Malawi who 
applied for an agricultural input loan in 2007. Farmers in the study 
were randomly allocated to either a control group or a treatment 
group; each member in the latter group had a fingerprint collected 
as part of their loan application and an explanation that this would 
be used to determine their identity on any future applications. 
(Fingerprint recognition was used instead of face, iris, or retina 
recognition because the technology has been commercially available 
since the early 1970s, and there is a highly competitive market for 
it. Therefore, it is inexpensive, well known, and widely used.) Both 
treatment and control groups were given a training session on the 
importance of credit history in ensuring future access to credit.
The study shows that within the subgroup of farmers who had 
the highest ex ante default risk, fingerprinting led to increases in 
repayment rates of about 40 percent. By contrast, fingerprinting had 
no impact on repayment for farmers with low ex ante default risk. 
These higher repayment rates are due to fingerprinted borrowers 
requesting smaller loan amounts to ensure they would be able to 
repay them and devoting more land and inputs to paprika, thus 
diverting fewer resources to other crops; the same cannot be said 
for their nonfingerprinted counterparts.
A rough cost–benefit analysis of the pilot experiment suggests 
that the benefits from improved repayment greatly outweigh the 
costs of biometric equipment and fingerprint collection, which 
accounts for basic training and the time it takes credit officers 
to collect biometric data. These costs, however, do not include 
a full implementation plan, which would likely require software 
integration, expanded data-storage facilities, upgraded equipment, 
and more in-depth staff training.
Challenges in the implementation  
of biometric systems
Despite the encouraging results from the pilot in Malawi and 
the success of biometric technology in controlled laboratory 
environments, there are still concerns and challenges when 
collecting and using such information in real life and when trying to 
establish an identification system at a national level.
•  Not everyone can participate in a fingerprint-based 
identification system. Fingerprints can be unrecognizable 
due to cuts or burns. In addition, older individuals may have 
fingerprints that have worn with age, and the operation of 
fingerprint readers may be jeopardized due to arthritis. In some 
areas, especially those with past or present conflict, individuals 
may lack fingers altogether. In the most comprehensive study 
to test the process and customer attitude during the recording 
of biometric information, the United Kingdom passport service 
trial reports an enrollment success rate of 100 percent for the 
9,250 nondisabled participants and 96 percent for the  
750 disabled participants. In Malawi, only about 2 percent of 
the sample of 1,600 fingerprinted farmers had to have their 
left thumbprint recorded when the scanner failed to capture 
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because many Malawian farmers grow tobacco, which requires 
the heavy use of fingertips in the transplant of seedlings. Over 
the years, their fingerprint ridges may become too worn to be 
read or captured by a fingerprint scanner.
•  The accuracy of biometric technology remains, to a large 
extent, untested. Biometric companies report very high 
accuracy rates from highly controlled trials that typically use 
artificially generated data. However, because the performance 
of a technology depends greatly on the context in which it 
is used, trials using real-life data are far less impressive. For 
example, the United Kingdom passport service trial reports 
that only 80 percent of the participants could be correctly 
verified by their fingerprints, and younger individuals were 
more successfully identified than older ones. In Malawi, 
however, everyone selected during demonstration sessions was 
correctly identified.
•  Individuals may have a negative attitude toward providing their 
biometrics. People may be reluctant to place their fingers on 
scanners due to hygiene concerns. More importantly, there is 
the widespread public perception that fingerprinting is linked 
to the criminal justice process. Therefore, in conflict-affected 
countries that are stricken by ethnic infighting, individuals 
may refuse to provide biometrics for fear of persecution by 
authorities or others who could gain illegal access to such 
biometric records. The parliamentary debates concerning the 
United Kingdom’s identification cards bill revealed that  
55 percent of poll respondents thought the collection of 
biometric information was an infringement of civil liberties. The 
authors did not encounter any such resistance from farmers in 
Malawi, perhaps because the technology was very novel.
•  The cost of collecting biometrics can be high. The estimates 
are sparse, and detailed cost–benefit analyses have not been 
systematically conducted. However, the costs of using different 
types of biometric technology—from basic fingerprinting 
techniques to voice- and iris-recognition software—can be 
prohibitively expensive. In India there are legitimate concerns 
that the costs of rolling out biometric technology may mean a 
huge opportunity cost for more than 700 million Indians living 
in poverty to receive social benefits. In the United Kingdom, a 
critical report by several researchers at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science found that the government 
underestimated the implementation of the Identity Cards 
Bill. The report suggests that the ten-year rollout would cost 
between 10.6 billion and 19.2 billion pounds (compared to the 
government estimate of 5.84 billion pounds over the same 
period), excluding public- or private-sector integration costs.
•  Biometric technology is not infallible. While biometric 
identification systems can help combat identity theft, fraud, 
and money laundering, they are essentially technological 
applications and, as with any other technology, can be hacked 
or infiltrated. These systems therefore run the risk of having 
data fall into the wrong hands. Since biometric technology 
is only being piloted on a large scale in some pockets of the 
world at present, legitimate concerns on privacy do arise. For 
example, it is possible to imagine that identification-database 
workers will be threatened, blackmailed, and possibly corrupted. 
After all, the perpetrators of 80 percent of all computer security 
lapses are not hackers, but employees. 
•  It is important that a common platform be used if biometric 
data are merged with other datasets. Biometric data are stored 
in formats that may not be compatible with the information 
systems of other government agencies, so an effort must be 
made to have compatibility if biometrics are to serve as the 
basis for a national identification system.
Conclusion
Despite these concerns, biometric technology presents an exciting 
and innovative opportunity for increased access to financial markets 
and better delivery of social assistance programs such as conditional 
cash transfers, aid distribution, or subsidized inputs or commodities. 
Whether it can be scaled up effectively and used to resolve 
identification and authentication issues is a challenge that requires 
more research.  n
For further reading: X. Giné, J. Goldberg, and D. Yang, 
“Identification Strategy: A Field Experiment on Dynamic 
Incentives in Rural Credit Markets,” mimeo (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, 2009); U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Using Biometrics for Border Security (Washington, D.C.: 
2002); London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE) Identity Project, www.identityproject.lse.ac.uk.
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 griculture is an inherently risky economic activity. A large 
 array of uncontrollable elements can affect output 
production and prices, resulting in highly variable economic returns 
to farm households. In developing countries, farmers also lack 
access to both modern instruments of risk management—such as 
agricultural insurance, futures contracts, or guarantee funds—and 
ex post emergency government assistance. Such farmers rely 
on different “traditional” coping strategies and risk-mitigation 
techniques, but most of these are inefficient. Formal and semiformal 
arrangements—such as contract farming, joint-liability lending, and 
value-chain integration—have arisen in recent decades, but they 
too are limited and can be very context sensitive. One consequence 
of inadequate overall financial risk management is that farmers in 
general face constrained access to formal finance. The smaller the 
net worth of the farm household, the worse the degree of exclusion.
Formal lenders avoid financing agriculture for a host of 
reasons: high cost of service delivery, information asymmetries, lack 
of branch networks, perceptions of low profitability in agriculture, 
lack of collateral, high levels of rural poverty, or low levels of farmer 
education and financial literacy. But, predominantly, bank managers 
around the world say they will not finance agriculture because 
of the high degree of uncontrolled production and price risk that 
confronts the sector. A farmer can be an able and diligent manager 
with an excellent reputation for repayment, guaranteed access to 
a market, and high-quality technical assistance, but an unexpected 
drought or flood can force him or her to involuntarily default. In 
emerging countries with fair to high levels of agricultural market 
and trade integration, large commercial farmers may escape this 
predicament because they have the ability to purchase insurance, 
engage in price hedging, obtain financing overseas, or liquidate 
assets quickly in the event of a default. Consequently, formal 
lenders tend to overemphasize the use of immoveable collateral as 
the primary buffer against default risk, which means they provide 
services to a limited segment of the farm population. Small- and 
medium-sized farmers, who constitute the vast majority of farm 
operators, often do not have secured-title land, which is the 
preferred type of collateral; if they do, its value may be insufficient 
to cover the loan in question. Even if farmers have sufficient titled 
land to collateralize loans, they may refuse low-interest formal loans 
and assume high-interest informal ones that have no collateral 
requirements instead. They may also use savings to finance 
agricultural production because they are averse to risking their most 
prized possession—land. The result is limited supply or access to 
formal agricultural financing, even though much of the population 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia is rural and depends on 
agriculture and livestock rearing for their main livelihood activities.
Typical risk-management mechanisms in rural 
financial intermediaries
In developing countries, formal and semiformal rural financial 
intermediaries have limited or nonexistent means to transfer credit 
risk to third parties through, for example, portfolio securitization or 
credit insurance, which were common in mortgage and consumer 
finance markets in developing countries prior to the 2008 financial 
crash. If more farm borrowers held agricultural insurance policies, 
this could serve to reduce credit risk for financial institutions, 
but agricultural insurance markets are grossly underdeveloped 
in middle- and low-income countries. For example, agricultural 
premiums totaled US$18.5 billion worldwide in 2008, but the 
United States and Canada accounted for 62 percent of the premium 
volume. Latin American, Asian, and African regions, home to most of 
the lower-income countries, accounted for 21 percent, or  
US$3.88 billion. Moreover, the leading countries in terms of 
agricultural insurance development—the United States, Canada, 
and Spain—all depend on heavily subsidized schemes that would be 
difficult to replicate in other places.
Thus, most of the strategies available to financial intermediaries 
in developing countries involve coping with and absorbing 
credit default risk. There are two broad means of evaluating 
creditworthiness: appraisal of repayment capacity and asset-
backed lending. The former approach focuses on analyzing the 
debt-paying capacity of a potential borrower using either human 
experts or statistical models, while the latter focuses on the quality 
and quantity of assets that can be pledged as collateral and how 
quickly that collateral can be liquidated in the event of a default. 
Since titled assets are scarce outside of large farms and extensive 
databases on farm enterprises rarely exist in developing countries, 
the following represent the four credit risk-management techniques 
used successfully by rural financial intermediaries.
Expert-based credit evaluation systems: Trained credit 
officials conduct financial analysis of the client, focusing on 
household cash flow, market situation, assessment of managerial 
or entrepreneurial ability, and reputation. Institutions can have 
centralized or decentralized systems to approve client requests 
as long as both systems include performance incentives for and 
investments in staff members, who should be recruited from the 
region of operations. To quickly determine client willingness to repay 
loans, staff members need access to credit bureaus or borrowers’ 
utility bill payments. Agriculture requires a wide range of experts 
since it is such a heterogeneous field; therefore, an expert-based 
evaluation system is expensive to both develop and maintain. 
Portfolio diversification: In order to dilute risk, intermediaries 
consciously seek to diversify the agricultural loans approved 
by geographic region, commodity, and type of household. This 
technique can be implemented only by large institutions that 
operate in more than one agroclimatic zone, however. 
Portfolio exposure limit: Because agricultural lending is risky 
and expensive, high-performing financial intermediaries tend to limit 
exposure to agriculture in their loan portfolio. For example, recent 
survey data in Latin America found that the average share is less 
than 40 percent. The smaller the share agriculture has in a total loan 
portfolio, the less vulnerable the institution is to systemic external 
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more cross-subsidization can occur. High-margin financial products—
such as consumer finance and urban microfinance—can compensate 
for lower profit margin products, such as agricultural loans.
Excessive provisioning: The last line of defense is called 
“loan loss provisioning,” meaning an internal absorption of credit 
risk. Adequate provisioning according to a risk-classification 
scheme helps to protect the intermediary from liquidity and capital 
adequacy crises. Some leading agricultural lenders in Latin America, 
for example, provision from 121 to 260 percent of doubtful loans. 
Heavy provisioning, however, clearly constrains the volume of 
lending, ability to make a profit, and client outreach potential.
Implications for managers of financial 
institutions and public policymakers
There are numerous implications of these credit risk-management 
techniques. First, the credit risk evaluation systems are labor 
intensive with high costs, which, in turn, contribute to high lending 
interest rates. Public-sector policymakers need to understand this, 
so they avoid imposing interest rate ceilings or forcing publicly 
owned banks to charge interest rates that are lower than their true 
operating costs because results would then be counterproductive. 
Additionally, fewer intermediaries would be willing or able to serve 
the sector. Therefore, both policymakers and managers should focus 
on developing and implementing institutional innovations—such 
as credit bureaus, applications of information and communication 
technology, and delegated agent models of service delivery—that 
will reduce overall operating costs. 
Second, agricultural lending cannot be the primary type 
of lending unless robust risk-transfer techniques (for example, 
insurance, futures, and securitization) become more commonplace. 
In place of land, alternative forms of collateral—including warehouse 
receipts, accounts receivable, equipment, and standing crops or 
livestock—should be more widely accepted. Improved contract 
enforcement should be aggressively promoted as well. These 
developments would all serve to lower lender risk. Many of these 
innovations and institutional developments require legal and 
regulatory reforms, modernization of property registries, investments 
in information infrastructure, and massive education efforts.
Third, the majority of institutions involved in agricultural 
lending are small and unregulated. They are using adapted 
microcredit-lending technologies that do not fully meet the 
needs of farmers, especially those needs regarding loan term and 
repayment frequencies. These shortcomings pose default risks in 
and of themselves. The larger institutions that have the scale and 
scope tend not to enter into agricultural lending because they 
do not have the strategic commitment, proper staff, or branch 
networks. Donors and governments can play a vital role in assisting 
these smaller institutions to grow, consolidate, and eventually 
merge. They can also help rural financial intermediaries with liability 
diversification through mobilization of savings, access to capital 
markets, and the provision of long-term lines of credit that could 
facilitate more term lending. Nevertheless, donors and governments 
must price the discount line of credits in a manner that will not 
undermine savings mobilization.
Conclusion
In short, risk management needs to improve dramatically so that 
agricultural finance can flourish. Strides have been made in recent 
years in reducing information problems and transaction costs 
through, respectively, peer-group lending and a greater reliance on 
information and communication technology. Uncontrollable risk, 
however, continues to be a major impediment to the development 
of more efficient rural financial markets. Renewed private–public 
sector efforts and higher amounts of investments will be required 
at various levels to address these issues. At the farmer level, 
governments need to spur the rebuilding of farm extension services, 
while farmers need to become more financially literate and save 
more so they can retain some of the risks. Governments, donors, 
and insurance companies need to collaborate in the development 
of yield-insurance products that are inexpensive, sustainable, and 
appropriately designed. Governments, commodity exchanges, and 
financial institutions likewise need to collaborate in developing 
futures, structured finance products, and other hedging instruments 
to reduce price risk. 
At present, the lack of high-quality weather data, inadequate 
distribution of weather stations, limited supply of people with risk-
modeling capabilities and expertise in agricultural risk management, 
small capital markets, and weaknesses in regulatory and legal 
infrastructure hamper the pace of progress. Since the depth and 
efficiency of financial markets are highly correlated with the speed 
of overall economic development, innovative methods of improving 
rural financial services will be critical in facilitating and sustaining 
any marked improvement in rural welfare.  n
For further reading: H. Bhattacharya, Banking Strategy, 
Credit Appraisal and Lending Decisions: A Risk-Return Frame-
work, (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1996); J. 
B. Caoutte, E. I. Altman, and P. Narayanan. Managing Credit 
Risk: The Next Great Financial Challenge, (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1998); C. Trivelli, and A. Tarazona, 
Riesgo y Portafolios Agropecuarios: Lecciones desde la Expe-
riencia de Instituciones Financieras de América Latina, Docu-
mento de Trabajo 151 (Lima, Perú: Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, 2007), www.iep.org.pe/textos/DDT/DDT151.pdf; 
M. Wenner, S. Navajas, C. Trivelli, and A. Tarazona, Manag-
ing Credit Risk in Rural Financial Institutions in Latin America, 
Sustainable Development Department Best Practices Series 
MSM 139 (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development 
Bank, 2007); World Bank, Doing Business database, www.
doingbusiness.org/economyrankings.
Mark D. Wenner (markw@iadb.org) is a lead financial specialist in the Capital Markets and Financial Institutions Division of the Inter-American 
Development Bank.
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Supported by the CGIAR
Copyright © 2010 International Food Policy Research Institute and the World Bank.  All rights reserved. Contact ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org or pubrights@worldbank.org for permission to republish. 
sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty
Supported by the CGIAR www.ifpri.org www.worldbank.orgT
he El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a climate event 
associated with warming sea surface temperatures in the 
Pacific Ocean. In years of extreme El Niño events, areas in northern 
Peru experience catastrophic flooding. As of 2010, it is possible 
for stakeholders in northern Peru to purchase a new form of 
insurance that pays out just as flooding begins and stakeholders 
begin incurring extra costs and consequential losses. Given the high 
basis risk associated with selling index insurance to households, 
this insurance is designed for firms and institutions that serve 
households that are highly exposed to El Niño. ENSO insurance 
is sold by a Peruvian insurance company, and a major global 
reinsurer carries most of the risk. This new insurance product is 
the first insurance to use sea surface temperature as the proxy 
for catastrophic losses and also the first regulated “forecast index 
insurance” product in the world. This innovation could enhance 
progress in developing index-based insurance products for extreme 
weather events.
Recent years have seen a growing number of pilot tests 
of index insurance for weather risk, motivated by an increased 
understanding of how natural disasters affect developing countries. 
Beyond immediate suffering (including deaths, destroyed assets, and 
lost income), disasters have troublesome indirect effects: economic 
growth can be disrupted, the poor are thrust into permanent 
poverty traps, and the mere presence of these risks constrains access 
to financial services and causes many decisionmakers to pursue low-
return, low-risk strategies that impede economic progress.
Much of the development of index insurance focuses on 
agriculture, because activities associated with agriculture remain 
the primary livelihood strategies for the rural poor in developing 
countries. Thus far, most index insurance pilots have involved 
products targeted at households—that is, micro-level products. 
Index insurance uses an objective measure (an index) of a natural 
event known to cause losses (such as excess rain, high river levels, or 
extreme sea surface temperatures). Using an index as the proxy for 
loss dispenses with expensive loss assessments. Furthermore, use of 
an index diminishes moral hazard and adverse selection, problems 
that plague traditional forms of insurance. Given these advantages, 
index insurance may be well suited to developing countries where 
data are sparse and delivery of financial services to smallholder 
households increases the per-unit cost of traditional insurance.
Despite the promise of index insurance, uptake by smallholder 
households is slow. Presently, index insurance may be better 
suited for risk aggregators—that is, groups or institutions that 
aggregate the risk of households either through the services 
they provide or through informal risk-sharing arrangements (for 
example, agricultural lenders, firms in the value chain, and farmer 
associations). Focusing first on risk aggregators should also help 
build linkages and sustainable products that will directly serve 
smallholder households.
Index insurance and correlated losses 
As a precondition of index insurance, losses created by the natural 
disaster to be insured must be strongly correlated—that is, a large 
number of individuals must suffer losses at the same time. Given 
that many individuals suffer a loss at the same time, risk aggregators 
will also suffer serious losses. Thus, correlated losses from natural 
disasters constrain the development of credit markets for the rural 
poor, particularly for those involved in agriculture. Lenders cannot 
absorb the risk exposure of a large number of borrowers who may be 
unable to pay off loans after a major natural disaster.
Likewise, an insurer deciding to write any form of insurance 
against extreme weather events must have a means to transfer these 
risks—generally through a global reinsurer. Insurers in developing 
countries often find obtaining access to reinsurance markets 
difficult. If the index being used is fully transparent, the global 
reinsurer is more likely to feel comfortable with the systems used to 
estimate the index. This is certainly the case for ENSO measurements, 
which have been developed over more than 50 years by the U.S. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Extreme weather events such as drought and flooding can also 
have associated consequential losses that extend beyond traditional 
crop insurance, which pays for losses of a specific crop. For example, 
in a number of African countries, where owning livestock is a form 
of savings, extreme droughts compel large numbers of farmers to 
sell their livestock at the same time. Distressed sales of livestock 
on local markets depress local prices, compounding losses. Floods 
and droughts also generally influence the quality of crops, not just 
yields. Moreover, risk-management strategies to diversify cropping 
enterprises can quickly prove ineffective if droughts or floods 
negatively affect all of the crops at the same time.
ENSO insurance as a form of business-
interruption insurance
In Peru, where ENSO insurance is being tested, the consequential 
losses and problems associated with extreme rainfall and 
catastrophic flooding are enormous—crops are lost, trees die, soils 
wash away, transportation systems break down, incidence of disease 
(such as malaria) increases, and markets are destroyed. When 
individuals and local markets suffer in this fashion, firms in the 
value chain and the financial sector also suffer.
In the extreme El Niño years 1983 and 1998, the volume of 
water in the Piura River was about 40 times greater than normal. 
Although Piura was among the worst-affected areas, a number of 
other regions in northern Peru were also severely affected. In 1998, 
with a clear indication that El Niño was coming, farmers simply did 
not plant crops, resulting in a 27 percent drop in fertilizer sales in 
northern Peru. Agricultural lending was growing at a significant 
pace before the 1997–98 El Niño, but that growth came to a halt 
after the event. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) had a significant 
increase in problem loans. Because of the 1998 El Niño, the default 
rate on agricultural loans increased from about 8 percent of all 
agricultural loans to more than 18 percent for MFIs operating in the 
region of Piura. Loan default is defined as loans that were 60 days 
late or more in payments. Once loans fall into this category, the 
probability of collection is nearly zero. Additionally, member deposits 
and savings—the major sources of capital for the MFIs— declined 
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problems created by the event. It took at least three years to recover 
from the compounded problems of loan defaults, loan restructuring, 
and savings and member deposit withdrawals.
ENSO insurance was presented to the Peruvian insurance 
regulators as a form of business-interruption insurance designed 
to pay for consequential losses and extra costs linked to extreme 
flooding, which is highly correlated with ENSO. ENSO insurance 
fits well in a class of insurance called “contingency insurance.” 
Contingency insurance is intended to protect policyholders against 
a variety of consequences associated with a specific event; these 
consequences can include loss of assets, losses in normal business 
revenues, and increased costs associated with addressing the event. 
Experience in Peru suggests that formulating index insurance as 
contingency insurance against a natural disaster has potential 
applications in many regions of the world highly exposed to severe 
weather risks such as drought or flood.
The ENSO insurance uses the monthly sea surface temperature 
for ENSO Region 1.2 (0–10° South, 80–90° West), measured and 
reported by the NOAA Climate Prediction Center. The basis for 
payment is the average of two months—November and December. 
Three contracts are available with three different thresholds where 
payments begin (23.4, 24.0, and 24.5 degrees Celsius); each of 
these contracts reaches a maximum when the measure reaches 
27 degrees. The payout function is linear. Indemnity payments 
are made in early January, just as flooding begins, and flooding 
continues from February to April.
Indemnity payments are made by multiplying the payout rate 
times the sum insured, which is selected by the insured party. A risk 
assessment that estimates the largest losses that may occur under 
the worst flooding event is likely the best starting point for selecting 
a sum to be insured. Prudent buyers of insurance will be more 
likely to select a value that is less than these estimates, given the 
expense of this type of insurance and the fact that they have other 
risk-management mechanisms that can be blended with the ENSO 
insurance in an optimal fashion.
Since the ENSO insurance pays before the catastrophe, 
educational efforts have focused on helping people in the target 
markets understand how to use the extra cash to mitigate the 
impending crisis. Farmers’ associations in remote regions of Piura have 
expressed an interest in using the funds to clear drainage systems 
because heavy rains associated with ENSO increase the likelihood that 
drainage systems will clog. Lenders are interested in using payments 
to ease the liquidity crisis and associated cost. Those in the value 
chain are interested in smoothing their losses and maintaining their 
specialized workforce when revenues are temporarily low because 
of El Niño. Finally, ENSO insurance is also being offered to local 
and regional governments to provide ready cash to mitigate some 
problems associated with catastrophic flooding.
To begin, the insurance company is offering ENSO insurance 
only to highly exposed risk aggregators. Demand from other firms 
and institutions that are exposed to El Niño risk will then drive the 
expansion of this market. Anecdotal evidence points to substantial 
interest in ENSO insurance. After some initial press releases on the 
product, the insurer was inundated with calls from a variety of 
firms and institutions interested in the product. At this stage, ENSO 
insurance is not being made available to smallholder households. 
The product can, however, be tied to other financial services in a 
fashion that gives smallholders greater access to these services at 
better prices.
Conclusion
El Niño events affect many regions of the world. The most dramatic 
effects probably occur in Peru and Ecuador, but El Niño affects 
other countries in South, Central, and North America as well 
as in Southeast Asia and East Africa. In some regions, El Niño 
is associated with flooding, and in others it is associated with 
drought. Although no other region may have as strong a correlation 
between sea surface temperature and flooding as northern Peru and 
southern Ecuador, this project may increase awareness and lead to 
new thinking and opportunities regarding the potential for forecast 
index insurance and the relationship between natural disaster risk 
and oceanic oscillations such as ENSO.  n
For further reading: J. R. Skees, J. Hartell, and A. Murphy, 
“Using Index-based Risk Transfer Products to Facilitate 
Micro Lending in Peru and Vietnam,” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 89 (2007): 1255–61; J. R. Skees, “Chal-
lenges for Use of Index-based Weather Insurance in Lower-
Income Countries,” Agricultural Finance Review 68 (Spring 
2008): 197–217; J. R. Skees and B. J. Barnett, “Enhancing 
Micro Finance Using Index-based Risk Transfer Products,” 
Agricultural Finance Review 66 (2006): 235–50.
Jerry R. Skees (jskees@uky.edu) is president of GlobalAgRisk and the H. B. Price professor of policy and risk in the Department of Agricultural Economics 
at the University of Kentucky. Benjamin Collier (benjamin@globalagrisk.com) is an employee of GlobalAgRisk and a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at the University of Kentucky.
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Supported by the CGIAR
Copyright © 2010 International Food Policy Research Institute and the World Bank.  All rights reserved. Contact ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org or pubrights@worldbank.org for permission to republish. 
sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty
Supported by the CGIAR www.ifpri.org www.worldbank.orgP
oor people in developing countries are vulnerable to a broad 
range of shocks that affect their livelihoods, including illness, 
accidents, and death as well as loss of assets such as animals, crops, 
and machinery. The poor are still predominantly rural, and their 
vulnerability is even higher than that of their urban peers. Health 
facilities are less available and less well equipped in rural areas; 
water, sanitation, roads, and telecommunication are less developed; 
and people are less educated and not as aware of risk-mitigation 
mechanisms. Given the rural character of poverty in many countries, 
poverty reduction remains strongly connected to agricultural 
development, and sustainable agricultural development depends on 
well-organized risk mitigation. One important tool for mitigating risk 
is microinsurance.
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) 
defines microinsurance as “insurance that is accessed by the low-
income population, provided by a variety of different providers 
but run in accordance with generally accepted insurance practices 
(including the IAIS Insurance Core Principles).” It differs from 
traditional insurance in that it is adapted to the circumstances of the 
poor: premiums are low, products have simple designs, it is offered 
through well-trusted and innovative channels, premium payments 
are flexible, and claims are settled promptly.
Microinsurance has the potential to enable the rural poor to 
mitigate the effects of shocks that threaten their lives, productivity, 
and assets. It can help prevent emergencies from depleting poor 
people’s savings and other assets. Furthermore, it allows households 
to invest in high-risk, high-return activities by securing the lending 
risk for agricultural and other investments.
Financial sector reforms in many countries have begun to 
include insurance as an important pro-poor financial service along 
with other microfinance services such as savings, lending, and 
cashless payments. According to a study by the International Labour 
Organization, microinsurance in Africa almost doubled from 2006 
to 2009. The survey shows that half of the schemes were growing 
faster than 30 percent a year between 2007 and 2008. Data on 
growth in rural areas, however, are not available.
Microinsurance in rural areas
Providing microinsurance in rural areas can be more difficult than in 
urban settings and requires some adaptations in terms of insurance 
products, risk carriers, delivery, and servicing. The characteristics 
of its market make sales and pricing more difficult. Because 
educational levels are usually lower in rural areas, low-income 
households’ financial capability is weaker. Potential customers 
often distrust insurance. Affordability is another challenge because 
rural people rely on seasonal and generally low incomes. Demand 
is not known or understood, products are poorly designed, and if 
microinsurance is available at all, the selection of policies is limited. 
Systems are not adapted to manage many small transactions 
for premium collection, back-office administration, and claims 
management. Population density is often low and distances are 
far, making it more difficult to reach scale. Distribution can suffer 
from the lack of channels like banking outlets. Risk assessment 
is difficult because of a lack of mortality and morbidity data. All 
these factors make underwriting more expensive, and therefore, 
the mostly urban-based insurers are not ready to serve rural low-
income markets. Rural providers are often small and informal, with 
the inherent challenges of such organizational forms, such as weak 
governance or limited range of products.
Experiences in providing microinsurance  
to the rural poor
Some microinsurance schemes tailored to rural areas provide 
useful lessons. For example, a pilot project in India, set up by the 
microfinance institution BASIX and a commercial insurer with the help 
of the World Bank, has been providing weather insurance for small 
farmers to improve their access to credit. This microinsurance scheme 
is based on a rainfall index. Payments are based not on individual loss 
adjustments—a costly undertaking not feasible in microinsurance—but 
rather on whether rainfall measured at a local weather station reaches 
a certain threshold. The insurance contracts are linked to credit 
because the insurance secures repayment of the loans.
At the outset, the project had to solve several problems like 
poor-quality weather data. Furthermore, the insurance provider 
strongly focused on raising awareness, capacity building, continuous 
product improvement, and quick payouts. Certain elements remain 
unresolved, such as basis risk (which occurs when the actual loss 
does not match the benefit because a payout is triggered but 
there is no loss or vice versa), high premiums, clients’ difficulties 
understanding this complex product, and low demand due to these 
factors. Nevertheless, the Indian weather insurance market is growing 
strongly, and new microinsurance providers are entering the market.
Innovations are also taking place in the policy area. Insurance 
regulators across the globe are working to create an enabling 
framework for insurance products, delivery channels, and new 
providers. Brazil and Ghana are among the countries changing their 
regulations, and South Africa aims to integrate thousands of existing 
informal burial societies into the mainstream insurance sector.
The Philippines has already made such a regulatory move. In 
2006 the Insurance Commission of the Philippines issued Insurance 
Memorandum Circular No. 9-2006, which provided a definition of 
microinsurance and spelled out the requirements for registering a 
microinsurance mutual benefit association. As a result, by the end of 
2009, microinsurance mutuals covered 2 million policyholders. Now 
the Philippine government is pursuing a wider approach that aims to 
increase access to microinsurance products and services by including 
different kinds of actors. The country’s National Microinsurance 
Strategy and regulatory framework focus on increasing private-
sector participation in the provision of microinsurance and the 
mainstreaming of informal insurance.
Another groundbreaking example of dedicated microinsurance 
regulation can be found in India. India was the first country to pass 
regulations covering microinsurance products and agents in 2005. 
In addition, India made it compulsory for all insurers to provide 
microinsurance to the rural and social sectors (the “social sector” 
includes the unorganized sector, informal sector, economically 
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Although the evidence on requiring insurers to provide 
microinsurance is mixed (as insurers may consider the penalties 
a cost of doing business), this approach has stimulated a large 
number of pilot projects and provided useful lessons for the 
industry and for policymakers.
Today, insurance supervisors all over the world are expressing 
strong interest in sharing experiences and understanding the 
dynamics of an enabling regulatory and policy environment. 
In response to this interest, the IAIS, in partnership with the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, the International Labour 
Organization, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, and Finmark Trust, created the global “Access 
to Insurance Initiative” (www.access-to-insurance.org) to foster 
capacity development and standard setting for insurance supervisors.
Key challenges for the development  
of microinsurance markets in rural areas
Much has been learned about developing effective and broad-based 
microinsurance markets in the past few years, but a number of 
challenges still face efforts to extend microinsurance in rural areas: 
1. The strategy and policy challenge: A holistic approach to 
improving the financial system addresses the actors on three 
levels: it focuses simultaneously on framework conditions 
involving sector strategies, regulation, and supervision (macro 
level); service providers and public goods (meso level); and 
insurers, intermediaries, and customers (micro level). Rural 
development policies and financial sector development policies 
need to include microinsurance, and public resources need to 
be made available.
2. The underwriting challenge: Underwriting in rural areas faces 
higher risks and weaker infrastructure, which requires special 
attention from policymakers and development organizations. 
Community-based and mutual types of underwriters are more 
common in rural areas than in urban areas, and they often 
require institution-building support. International development 
cooperation agencies can help by supporting capacity building 
and investment.
3. The delivery challenge: Delivery channels that are close and 
easy to use and support rural delivery need to be strengthened. 
These channels can include cell-phone banking and retail shops. 
Community-based organizations play an important role in 
providing microinsurance in rural areas, and these organizations 
are often the risk carriers. This situation is suboptimal because 
of their limited reserves and management skills. Converting 
them from insurers to delivery channels could mitigate many of 
these problems.
4. The consumer challenge: Consumer-related challenges, such as 
affordability, insurance literacy, and consumer protection, need 
a special look. Affordability is more sensitive in rural areas than 
in urban areas because rural residents face higher cash-flow 
fluctuations in agriculture and generally have lower incomes. 
More investments are needed in insurance literacy. Consumer 
protection is a greater challenge in rural areas because the 
ombudsman and courts are often far away, and a claimant 
needs to finance travel costs.
5. The support structure challenge: Service providers in 
microinsurance are often not active in rural areas and not 
equipped to transfer the required know-how and systems to 
their clients, the intermediaries, and insurers. Training courses 
for rural staff of insurers are more costly to organize. Service 
providers often face higher costs to assess demand or establish 
risk data for remote areas and therefore neglect rural areas.
6. The agricultural insurance challenge: Although index insurance 
can potentially overcome many of the problems associated with 
traditional insurance, it requires improving the availability of 
high-quality weather data, creating awareness among farmers, 
achieving quick payouts, and dealing with basis risk due to 
conditions that might affect farmers but are not incorporated 
in the index (such as soil composition or uneven terrain).
Conclusion
Rural microinsurance products and their sales strategies require 
huge investments in product innovation, literacy work, and 
establishment of sound providers and intermediaries. In addition, 
regulatory dedication and innovation are required to spur the 
provision of rural microinsurance by motivating and formalizing 
rural providers and developing adequate customer protection. 
Microinsurance is an integral part of the financial sector 
and should be promoted as such, through an “access to finance 
strategy.” Rural finance and rural development policies should 
explicitly deal with microinsurance, including agricultural 
microinsurance. Coherence with other sector policies—such as 
agricultural development policy, social security policy, or consumer 
protection policy—results in more effective approaches.  n
For further reading: German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Security at Little 
Cost: Microinsurance in Financial Systems Development (Bonn, 
2009), www.bmz.de/en/service/infothek/fach/konzepte/
konzept179.pdf; Lloyd’s and the Microinsurance Centre, 
Insurance in Developing Countries: Exploring Opportunities in 
Microinsurance (London and Appleton, WI, 2009); M. Mc-
Cord and J. Roth, Agricultural Microinsurance: Global Prac-
tices and Prospects (Appleton, WI: Microinsurance Centre, 
2008), www.microinsurancecentre.org/UI/DocAbstractDe-
tails.aspx?DocID=660.
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ndia has nearly 90 million farm households. More than 80 percent 
of these farmers operate on a small or marginal scale, farming 
less than two hectares of land. They also usually have one or two 
buffaloes or cows, reared for milk and dung. Most of these small 
and marginal farmers fall below the poverty line. To reduce overall 
poverty in India, it is important to enhance the incomes of small and 
marginal farmers. One way to do that is to provide credit so they 
can get access to yield-enhancing inputs like seed, fertilizer, and 
cattle feed, as well as acquire irrigation pumps and crossbred cattle. 
But these kinds of investments alone will not raise farmers’ incomes. 
Agricultural and livestock development services are also crucial to 
give farmers knowledge of improved practices and strengthen their 
links to markets.
BASIX is an Indian livelihood promotion institution working 
with more than a million poor households. Its mission is to promote 
sustainable livelihoods for a large number of rural poor people 
and women. When it started in 1996, BASIX’s primary focus was 
delivering microcredit to its customers. In 2001, however, BASIX 
asked the Indian Market Research Bureau to carry out an impact 
assessment, and the results were rather disappointing. Only  
52 percent of the customers, who had received at least three rounds 
of microcredit from BASIX, showed a significant increase in their 
income (compared with a control group); 25 percent reported no 
change in income level; and 23 percent reported a decline in their 
income level. BASIX then carried out a detailed study of those who 
had experienced no increase or a decline in income and found that 
the reasons for these results could be grouped into three factors:
1. unmanaged risk;
2. low productivity; and
3. unfavorable terms in input and output 
market transactions.
This analysis made clear the need for 
productivity enhancement, risk-mitigation 
services, and market linkages, as well as the 
need for rural producers to come together 
to amass greater bargaining power in 
the marketplace. In 2002, therefore, 
BASIX revised its strategy to provide a 
comprehensive set of livelihood promotion 
services to poor rural households. This 
livelihood triad strategy includes provision 
of financial inclusion services; agricultural, 
livestock, and enterprise development 
services; and institutional development 
services (Table 1).
What services are provided?
Under Agricultural, Livestock, and 
Enterprise Development (AGLED) services, 
BASIX currently provides services to 
farmers growing nine types of crops 
(cotton, groundnut, soybean, pulses, paddy rice, chilies, vegetables, 
mushrooms, and lac [a form of organic resin]) and two livestock 
products (dairy and meat [sheep and goat]). Nonfarm business 
development services are also provided in selected activities like 
tailoring, woodworking, bamboo work, and retail stores.
How are services delivered?
BASIX works in more than 25,000 villages through a network of  
150 branches, each with five field executives under a team leader. 
Each field executive supervises five livelihood service advisers 
(LSAs), who each cover about 10 villages, originating credit, selling 
insurance, and collecting repayments. The LSAs also sell AGLED 
Services. BASIX has more than 3,000 LSAs.
BASIX field executives identify and select villages or clusters 
of villages to receive these services. A cluster is a group of 
villages within a radius of 6 to 8 kilometers—a size that includes 
a reasonable customer base for delivering services effectively and 
efficiently. The branches start enrolling customers for services in 
those villages where there are at least 30 existing borrowers for 
either crop or livestock activity.
BASIX has built a cadre of nearly 1,000 livelihood services 
providers (LSPs). LSAs function as BASIX salespeople, whereas LSPs 
are similar to extension agents. An LSP works with BASIX on a 
regular basis and is typically a high-school graduate with training 
as a para-extension worker or a para-veterinarian. He or she covers 
200–400 customers for one crop or activity. BASIX distributes 
product brochures in regional languages telling customers what 
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•  Savings (directly in districts 
where BASIX has a banking 
license, and through other 
banks elsewhere)
•  Productivity enhancement: 
through increased yields, use 
of improved seed varieties or 
practices
•  Individual-level awareness 
building, skill enhancement, 
and entrepreneurship 
development
•  Credit: agricultural, allied, and 
nonfarm, short and long term
•  Productivity enhancement: 
reduction in costs
•  Formation of groups, 
federations, and cooperatives 
of producers
•  Insurance for lives and 
livelihoods, including weather 
index-based crop insurance
•  Risk mitigation (other than 
insurance), such as livestock 
vaccinations
•  Functional training in 
accounting and management 
information systems, using 
information technology 
•  Money transfer, for migrant 
workers
•  Local value addition, such as 
processing cotton into lint 
before selling
•  Building collaboration to 
deliver a wide range of 
services
•  Experimental products: 
micropensions, warehouse 
receipts, etc.
•  Alternative market linkages: 
input supply and output sales
•  Sector and policy work: 
analysis and advocacy for 
changes and reforms
Source: BASIX.
Table 1—Services included in the BASIX livelihood triadservices they will receive and when. Customers pay Rs 450 (US$10), 
including services tax, for a year of AGLED services.
Achievements
In 2009 BASIX had nearly half a million customers for AGLED 
services. About half of these customers were using agriculture 
and livestock services, and the rest were using services related to 
nonfarm activities. The details are as follows:
•  Agriculture: AGLED provided soil-testing service to more 
than 20,000 farmers, integrated pest management (IPM) or 
integrated nutrient management (INM) services to nearly 
75,000 crop customers, and field surveillance to more than 
30,000 farmers. It connected most customers to markets for 
inputs (seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and bio-inputs such as 
vermicompost and organic pesticides) and outputs. Weather 
index-based crop insurance was provided to more than  
10,000 farmers for different crops and in different agroclimatic 
zones, in collaboration with private insurance companies.
•  Livestock: BASIX AGLED services conducted health checkups of 
nearly 440,000 animals, vaccinated nearly 165,000 animals, and 
dewormed 125,000 animals. It trained more than  
36,000 customers on feed and fodder and better dairying 
practices. More than 60,000 farmers were linked to milk 
marketing chains of cooperatives or private dairy companies. 
Livestock insurance was provided for more than 120,000 animals, 
in collaboration with private insurance companies.
Lessons learned
It has taken BASIX about six years to reach the scale described, 
and it has learned many lessons along the way. In the initial two 
years, the main emphasis was on market research to identify 
which services farmers needed. This research, conducted through 
a large number of field visits and group interactions with farmers, 
showed that small farmers preferred cost-saving and risk-reducing 
interventions over yield-enhancing interventions requiring greater 
cash outlays. It also showed that it was not possible to handle these 
interventions for a large number of crops, so BASIX focused on a 
few crops grown by a large number of farmers, such as groundnut 
in southern Andhra Pradesh, cotton in northern Andhra Pradesh, 
and soybean in western Madhya Pradesh.
The next step was designing the service offerings. For example, 
enhancing productivity could mean increasing the yield or reducing 
the cost for the same output. Local agricultural universities and 
research stations made available many packages of practices for 
increasing yields, so BASIX decided to focus more on cost reduction. 
One successful example of this approach was stem application of 
pesticide in cotton, which reduced pest multiplication and thereby 
reduced the need to undertake a large number of pesticide sprays 
later. Another example was introduction of soil testing, which led 
to more precise and economical application of fertilizers. In the 
case of dairy animals, simple practices like vaccination and periodic 
deworming were more cost-effective than procurement of high-
yielding crossbred animals. 
Based on such experiences, BASIX staff learned how to 
customize AGLED services for different agroclimatic zones, which 
enhanced the farmers’ willingness to pay for these services. 
Customer satisfaction surveys conducted by independent audit 
teams found that the satisfaction level was nearly 80 percent, with 
the main cause of dissatisfaction being inadequate visits of the LSPs. 
To improve service, field executives introduced tighter monitoring of 
service delivery, but this practice turned out to be expensive. BASIX 
is now pilot testing mobile phone–based monitoring of service 
delivery through which farmers will be able to report incidents of no 
visit or poor service.
Sustainability and future plans
The income from AGLED services in 2009 was nearly Rs 145 million  
(US$3 million), and BASIX made a modest profit of nearly  
Rs 22 million (US$450,000) providing these services to nearly 
half a million customers. With more and more LSPs reaching the 
breakeven number of customers, profitability is likely to improve. 
BASIX also plans to move some basic facilities like soil-testing labs 
and artificial insemination centers under its own control to improve 
its service to farmers.
Although BASIX agricultural credit operations are aimed at 
small and marginal farmers, the organization plans to extend AGLED 
services to larger farmers (to whom BASIX does not extend credit) 
in the same villages. These farmers’ enhanced yields will generate 
additional output as well as employment opportunities for the 
landless poor—outcomes that are in line with the BASIX mission. 
So far BASIX has worked mainly in poorer dryland districts, but it 
is also considering providing AGLED services in irrigated districts 
where it has no credit operations. With these changes, BASIX is 
confident of reaching 2 to 3 million farmers with AGLED services in 
the next five years.  n
For further reading: BASIX, www.basixindia.com;  
P. Chandra Shekara, Status of Private Extension in India (Hy-
derabad: National Institute for Management of Agricultural 
Extension [MANAGE], 2002); R. Sulaiman and V. V. Sada-
mate, Privatising Agricultural Extension in India, Policy Paper 
10 (New Delhi: National Centre for Agricultural Economics 
and Policy Research [NCAP], 2000); S. K. Datta, A Perspec-
tive on Farmer-Market Interface: Results of a Revisit to Selected 
Villages from West Bengal, Gujarat, and Maharashtra (Ahmeda-
bad: Indian Institute of Management, 1999); V. Mahajan, 
“From Micro Credit to Livelihood Finance,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 40, no. 41 (2005): 4416–19; V. Mahajan, Be-
yond Microfinance, in C. Moser, ed., Reducing Global Poverty 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007).
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griculture is the largest economic sector in most African 
 countries and remains the best opportunity for economic 
growth and poverty alleviation on the continent. Yet, sadly, the 
sector has been in decline over the past 40 years, and poor farmers 
have largely remained poor. This failure is due to many factors, 
including collapsed agricultural development banks, corruption, 
inadequate infrastructure, and poor soils and seeds. It has also 
occurred because smallholder farmers lack access to critical 
information, market facilitation, and financial intermediation services.
This brief reviews the DrumNet Project and its approach to 
improving farmers’ access to finance in Kenya. The project has found 
that financing small-scale farmers is challenging given the cost and 
risk associated with serving rural, relatively isolated clients. Lending 
becomes increasingly feasible, however, in a supply-chain approach 
in which farmers are connected to a formal network of buyers, 
retailers, and financiers.
The DrumNet Project
Financing farmers is a difficult proposition in Africa. African 
farmers tend to be geographically dispersed, resource poor, and 
undereducated—all traits that amplify the costs and risks involved 
with lending. Other characteristics related to the agricultural 
sector, such as unpredictable weather patterns, long crop cycles, 
irregular market access, and volatile or high farm input costs, make 
the proposition even more unappealing to financial institutions. 
Consequently, agricultural lending constitutes less than 1 percent of 
the commercial lending taking place on the continent.
The DrumNet Project has operated in Kenya since 2005 
and employs proven microfinance principals and a supply-chain 
approach to promote agricultural lending (Figure 1). The project 
establishes relationships with key actors along a supply chain—a 
buyer, a bank, and several farm input retailers—and links them to 
smallholder farmers through a dedicated transaction platform and a 
fully integrated finance, production, delivery, and payment process. 
The targeted use of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) across the platform makes the process efficient, cost-effective, 
and practical in the African context.
The process begins when farmers (organized into farmer 
groups) sign a fixed-price purchase contract with an agricultural 
buyer. The contract allows farmers to approach a partner bank, 
obtain credit, and get farming inputs from a local, certified retailer. 
At harvest, the contracted produce is collected, graded, and sold to 
the buyer at designated collection points. A successful transaction 
triggers a cashless payment through a bank transfer. DrumNet 
serves as the intermediary in the flow of payment to ensure that 
credit is repaid before earnings reach farmers’ accounts. A master 
contract governs the entire process, and DrumNet’s information 
technology (IT) system monitors compliance.
The process creates an enabling environment for agricultural 
finance in several ways. First, banks are assured at the time of 
lending that farmers have a market for their produce and the means 
to adequately serve that market—two building blocks of a healthy 
revenue stream. Second, banks minimize the problem of loan 
diversion by offering in-kind credit to farmers for inputs and directly 
paying certified (and monitored) input retailers after distribution of 
the inputs. Finally, cashless payment through bank transfers reduces 
strategic default, since farmers cannot obtain revenue until their 
outstanding loans are fully repaid.
DrumNet has piloted its approach in Kenya’s horticultural and 
oilseed sectors, serving more than 3,000 farmers across five provinces.
Lessons learned, challenges faced
Since its start in 2005, the DrumNet Project has learned many 
lessons and undergone continual testing and redesign. DrumNet has 
found that by bundling services at various stages in the supply chain, 
its approach can enhance efficiency and build trust between actors 
in the chain. Together, that efficiency and trust help resolve many of 
the problems that historically discourage smallholder financing.
At the same time, DrumNet has encountered many 
challenges during implementation, particularly related to partner 
noncompliance and poor agricultural yields. In both situations, the 
outcome has been a substantial number of farmer loan defaults 
that eroded the interest of DrumNet’s crop-buying partner and the 
goodwill of its banking partner. These remaining challenges show 
that the package of services must be adjusted and enhanced as the 
project moves forward.
Partner noncompliance
For this approach to function properly, each supply-chain partner 
must abide by an established set of procedures and rules. Therefore, 
supply-chain actors must find value in and benefit from the 
arrangement at all times. In theory, this is the case. Farmers get 
to produce goods under structured agreements and obtain inputs 
that help them boost farm productivity. The buyer receives greater 
quantities of higher-quality product with limited field mobilization. 
Input retailers realize increased sales without taking on the burden 
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Flow of produce payment
Flow of farm inputs
Flow of farm input loan
Figure 1—DrumNet farm input loan and payment flow
Source: Authors.of offering credit themselves. And the bank captures a new 
customer market with minimal risk, adding to its loan portfolio and 
deposit base.
DrumNet has, however, experienced its share of 
noncompliance. Farmers have opted to side-sell produce outside 
buyer agreements to attain quick cash or evade loan obligations. 
Buyers have at times failed to honor contract terms, and input 
retailers have engaged in dishonest practices as well. Even 
banks have strayed from the program by delaying payments and 
introducing unexpected fees to farmers.
It is crucial to resolve the issue of partner noncompliance 
because the benefit any one actor accrues from DrumNet depends 
on other partners’ faithful completion of their functions in an 
agreed-upon manner. In other words, once one actor fails to comply 
because he or she does not find value in the arrangement, the 
overall value of the supply-chain approach is lost.
Low agricultural yields
Farmers’ inability to attain sufficient crop yields has also negatively 
affected the project and its overall service package. In many 
instances, poor yields have resulted from poor weather conditions. 
Kenya has experienced several years of irregular and insufficient rain, 
especially in the eastern portion of the country. Consequently, many 
farmers have produced only small or extremely stunted harvests.
Soil conditions in Kenya have also diminished farmers’ 
productivity. Because of population pressures, intensified 
agricultural activities, and low fertilizer use, many Kenyan famers 
have exhausted their soils. With such soil conditions, even the best 
agronomic practices result in disappointing yields, low returns on 
farm investments, and consequently further soil degradation from 
season to season. The use of poor seed varieties has exacerbated 
the problem.
The way forward
To address these challenges and others, DrumNet has identified 
products and services that can be bundled with or added as 
supplements to the supply chain:
•  Performance rating. DrumNet is devising a performance 
rating system that will be integrated into DrumNet processes to 
allow good and bad performers to be identified, thus creating 
an incentive for better partner behavior and commitment and 
distinguishing especially competent, reliable actors over time. 
Simple credit ratings could also serve as helpful indicators for 
banks as they assess potential borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
•  Crop insurance. A dedicated crop insurance product that 
insures farmers’ inputs against drought or other acts of 
God would reduce the weather risk inherent in agricultural 
financing, win further buy-in from farmers, and fill a crucial 
gap in this bundled, supply-chain approach. The product could 
be directly tied to input sales or incorporated into production 
contracts. Farmers would receive not only a guaranteed 
produce purchase price, but also guaranteed reimbursement or 
replacement of inputs.
•  Soil analysis. A soil analysis service would provide farmers 
with precise recommendations on how best to restore fertility 
to their soils and, accordingly, improve land productivity. A 
fertilizer matching component—matching the right fertilizers to 
a farmer’s particular soil composition—would make the analysis 
even more effective. The analysis could be offered by input 
retailers, thereby generating greater trust between farmers, 
retailers, and DrumNet.
•  Payment systems. Advances in electronic payment options 
should also play an important role as DrumNet moves into the 
future. Payment systems like M-PESA, ZAP, and MobiCash can 
increase the timeliness of transactions between supply-chain 
partners and move cash points closer to rural-based farmers. 
These payment solutions, together with the increasing number 
of bank products available in the market, will reduce the hassles 
farmers now incur when receiving payment.
DrumNet is now commercializing its operations through the 
formation of a private company in Kenya. The products and services 
described in this brief, along with others, are being incorporated 
into the new company’s platform. In addition, the company plans 
to upgrade DrumNet’s existing IT system, building a more robust 
and expandable system that is accessible to rural-based partners. 
The system will be modular in structure, so users with different 
requirements can select and use different components. Furthermore, 
the system’s functionality will be matched by its simplicity—it will 
easily plug in to the way users already conduct business.
To mitigate risk on a larger scale, comprehensive and commonly 
accepted standards for communication, financing, information, and 
exchange must be applied across different agricultural supply chains 
in Africa. It is in everyone’s interest to facilitate and enforce the 
development of these standards to ensure that all agricultural actors 
and initiatives operate under a single preferred paradigm.  n
For further reading: X. Giné, “DrumNet Case Study” 
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2005), siteresources.
worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/DrumnetCaseStudy.pdf; 
S. Arnquist, “In Rural Africa, a Fertile Market for Mobile 
Phones, New York Times, October 6, 2009, www.nytimes.
com/2009/10/06/science/06uganda.html; The Economist, 
“Security for Shillings: Insuring Crops with a Mobile Phone,” 
March 11, 2010, www.economist.com/business-finance/
displaystory.cfm?story_id=15663856; The Economist, “Dial 
M for Money: Beating Banks at Their Own Game,” June 28, 
2007, www.economist.com/business-finance/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=9414419.
Jonathan Campaigne (jfc@prideafrica.com) is executive director of PRIDE AFRICA. Tom Rausch (trausch@prideafrica.com) is PRIDE AFRICA’s regional 
director for East Africa. 
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First study prior to launch of M-PESA (multiple responses possible). Second study conducted two years post launch.
Figure 1—Impact framework for financial education
Figure 1—FinAccess reports on how people in Kenya send money
Source: B. Gray et al., “Can Financial Education Change Behavior?: Lessons from Bolivia and Sri Lanka,” Working Paper 4 (Microfinance 
Opportunities: Washington, D.C.: 2010).
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